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JAILING BLACK BABIES
James G. Dwyer*

I. INTRODUCTION
In reaction to the tremendous increase in incarceration of poor and minorityrace adults, perceiving that such adults suffer from losing not only liberty but also
family ties, and citing the damage that children suffer from parental incarceration,
advocates for prisoners have promoted programs to increase inmates’ contact with
their children. When convinced that such programs reduce criminal recidivism,
legislators and prison officials have approved and funded such programs. As
described in Part I, children-in-prison programs, which predominantly involve
children of minority race, range widely in the degree to which they make prison a
part of children’s lives. At the extreme, there is a fast-growing phenomenon of
states placing newborn children into prisons to live for months or years with their
incarcerated mothers, mostly in separate units termed “prison nurseries.”
Prison nurseries have not come at the urging of advocates for children, and
they have proceeded without research support for any hope of positive child
welfare outcomes. 1 As explained in Part II, there is still no evidence that increased
contact with incarcerated parents is on balance good for children, whereas there is
much reason to believe that bringing children into prisons is detrimental for them
and that this is especially true for minority-race children. Indeed, there is also no
evidence that the programs serve the aim of reducing recidivism. That advocates
for prison inmates are inclined to support placement of babies in adult prisons,
without empirical basis for believing it is good for the children and without
seriously considering the obvious alternative of adoption, betrays their willingness
to use children in an instrumental way to ameliorate the suffering of disadvantaged
adults.
Further evidence of this instrumental attitude toward predominantly minorityrace babies is the complete absence of consideration about whether prison
nurseries transgress legal limits on states’ power to put people in prison. Yet, there
certainly are limits, ones of tremendous importance to adults. The fact that some
persons are dependent and not self-determining cannot possibly mean they have no
* © 2014 James G. Dwyer. Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary
School of Law. This Article reflects an extraordinary amount of research, much of it quite
challenging. It would not have been possible without the exceptional work of librarian Paul
Hellyer and research assistants Kaitlin Gratton, Elizabeth Herron, Claire de Jong, Kylie
Madsen, Rebecca Pensak, Thomas O’Connor, and Lily Saffer.
1
See CHANDRA KRING VILLANUEVA, WOMEN’S PRISON ASS’N, MOTHERS, INFANTS
AND IMPRISONMENT: A NATIONAL LOOK AT PRISON NURSERIES AND COMMUNITY-BASED
ALTERNATIVES 15 (2009) (“Though the number of prison nursery and community-based
residential parenting programs has increased steadily over the last ten years, little research
has been conducted on the impact of these programs.”).
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right against confinement with adult criminals in state penal institutions. Indeed,
there would likely be widespread public outrage if any state began putting mentally
disabled or senile adults in prisons with incarcerated relatives in the hope that this
would reduce recidivism and provide some benefits to those incompetent adults.
Part III of this Article therefore presents the first analysis ever of how
constitutional and statutory rules governing incarceration and civil commitment
should apply to programs under which the state places children in prisons. It
concludes that existing programs patently violate children’s Fourteenth
Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. If such imprisonment
were ever constitutionally permissible, it could only be after an individualized
determination by a competent state authority, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that it is necessary, in order to avoid substantial harm to a particular
child, for the state to place that child in prison rather than in any available nonincarceration alternative placement, including adoption. No existing prison nursery
program satisfies this test. In addition, prison nurseries violate statutory
prohibitions on housing minors with incarcerated adults—laws enacted with
juvenile delinquents in mind but whose language and underlying premises extend
to all children. Thus, prison nurseries clearly contravene constitutional rights of
and statutory protections for children, and states should discontinue them
immediately.

II. THE CHILDREN-IN-PRISON PHENOMENON
United States prisons currently hold nearly 1.6 million people. 2 Women
constitute approximately 7% of those inmates, with more than 110,000. 3 Their
numbers have increased dramatically in recent decades, as has occurred also in
many other countries. 4 Women are most commonly imprisoned for violent
2

E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1 (2012), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11
.pdf; see also E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012, at 1 (2013), available at www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf (detailing the trends in the prisoner population for 2012).
3
CARSON & SABOL, supra note 2, at 2.
4
REBECCA PROJECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., MOTHERS
BEHIND BARS: A STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL POLICIES ON
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING WOMEN AND THE EFFECT
ON THEIR CHILDREN 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT CARD] (stating a fourfold increase
over three decades). In California, the number increased from 1,232 in 1979 to 11,416 in
2007. See Angela Wolf et al., The Incarceration of Women in California, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
139, 140 (2008). These trends are not unique to the United States; Europe has also seen an
escalation in the female prison population. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN’S HEALTH
IN PRISON: CORRECTING GENDER INEQUITY IN PRISON HEALTH 12 (2009), available at http:
//www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/Declaration_Kyiv_Women_60
s_health_in_Prison.pdf.
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offenses including murder, assault, and robbery (34%); property crimes such as
burglary, larceny, and fraud (30%); and drug offenses, predominantly trafficking
(27%). 5 The great majority have prior criminal charges when arrested for the crime
that triggers incarceration. 6 The average prison sentence of a convict who is a
mother is over four years. 7
Most female criminals leave children behind in their communities when they
enter prison, 8 though more than a third of these mothers were not living with their
children prior to arrest. 9 Furthermore, instead of or in addition to leaving children
behind, at least 5% of female convicts are pregnant when they enter prison, 10 and
an unknown number of other women become pregnant while in prison from
voluntary or involuntary sex with guards. 11 As a result, roughly two thousand
babies are born to prison inmates in the U.S. each year. 12
Most children with a parent in prison are of minority race. 13 Whereas the
general U.S. population is approximately 64% white, 16% Hispanic, and 13%
5

See PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2010, at 7, 28, 30 (2011); LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN 22 (2008). It is a frequently asserted myth that the “War on Drugs” is the
cause of mass incarceration in the United States, but in fact the primary explanation for the
great swelling of the prison population before 1990 is an explosion of violent crime. See
John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1087–89 (2013).
6
See, e.g., JULIE KOWITZ MARGOLIES & TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, WOMEN IN PRISON
PROJECT, WHEN “FREE” MEANS LOSING YOUR MOTHER: THE COLLISION OF CHILD
WELFARE AND THE INCARCERATION OF WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2006). See also
infra note 101.
7
See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, “SPECIAL REPORT: INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN” 6–7 (2000)
(providing statistics about prison sentences for mothers in federal and state prison).
8
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 2; Susan M. George, Incarcerated Mothers
and Their Children: A Decade Long Overview, in WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICE STRATEGIES 18-1, 18-4 (Russ Immarigeon
ed., 2006) [hereinafter WOMEN AND GIRLS] (noting that most incarcerated mothers gave
birth to four or more children).
9
See MARGOLIES & KRAFT-STOLAR, supra note 6, at 3; GLAZE & MARUSCHAK,
supra note 5, at 4.
10
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF JAIL
INMATES 1 (2006); Drika Weller Makariev & Phillip R. Shaver, Attachment, Parental
Incarceration and Possibilities for Intervention: An Overview, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM.
DEV. 311, 312 (2010).
11
See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text (discussing sexual abuse of female
inmates by guards).
12
Jenni Vainik, The Reproductive and Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers, 46
FAM. CT. REV. 670, 676 (2008).
13
SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproj
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black, 14 half of the children with a parent in prison are black, only one-fourth are
white, and most of the rest are Hispanic. 15 Black and Hispanic children are
respectively 7.5 and 2.5 times more likely to have a parent in prison than white
children. One-third of children whose mothers are in prison live primarily with
their fathers, while most of the rest are left in the care of a grandmother or other
relative. 16 For roughly one-tenth of imprisoned mothers, their children are in foster
care, 17 but nearly all of those children were already in foster care prior to the
mother’s conviction. 18 Contrary to the claims of some advocates for women
prisoners, 19 it is rare for a child to go into foster care because a parent enters

ect.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf (reporting that over 70%
of the 1.7 million children in America with a parent in prison in 2007 were “children of
color”).
14
See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/brie
fs/c2010br-02.pdf.
15
See SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (showing black children were 51% in
1997 and 45% in 2007 of all children with a parent in prison). In 2010, the female prison
population was approximately 46% white, 25% black, and 18% Hispanic. See GUERINO ET
AL., supra note 5, at 26. This suggests minority-race inmates have a higher average number
of children.
16
SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
17
See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 5; SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at
5.
18
See Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”: Mothering, Feminism, and
Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 173 (2012) (noting a study of
incarcerated women in Illinois which found that the majority “had a child in state care prior
to the woman’s imprisonment”); Marilyn C. Moses, Correlating Incarcerated Mothers,
Foster Care, and Mother-Child Reunification, CORRS. TODAY Oct. 2006, at 98, 98 (finding
“a child’s foster care status is rarely a direct result of a mother’s imprisonment”).
19
See, e.g., An Act Establishing a Child Nursery Facility at the Connecticut
Correctional Institution, Niantic: Hearing on H.B. 6642 Before the Judiciary Comm.
(Conn. 2013) [hereinafter Alexander’s Testimony] (testimony of Amanda Alexander,
member of Women, Incarceration, and Family Law Project at Yale Law School, asserting
that “[i]ncarcerated mothers are at particularly high risk of having their children placed in
foster care, as most are primary caretakers of the children before arrest”); Michal Gilad &
Tal Gat, U.S. v. Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of
Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 376 (2013) (“[I]t is reported
that many incarcerated mothers with children in foster care are unable to meet courtmandated family reunification requirements for contact and visitation with their children,
and consequently lose their parental rights.”); Alexandria Gutierrez, Sufferings Peculiarly
Their Own: The Thirteenth Amendment, in Defense of Incarcerated Women’s Reproductive
Rights, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 117, 164 & n.354 (2013) (advocating
women’s reproductive rights in the prison context under the Thirteenth Amendment and
asserting that children are taken away to foster care); Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster
Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1494 (2012)
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prison; even with children born before their mother’s incarceration, this occurs in
less than 2% of cases. 20 It is even rarer for babies born to inmates to be placed
immediately for adoption, as that occurs only if the mother chooses to relinquish
the child for adoption. 21
A. Range of Program Types
Traditionally, incarceration entailed a nearly complete severance of ties with
family, friends, and community. Indeed, loss of gratifying intimate relationships is
part of the suffering that makes imprisonment a deterrent to criminal activity.
However, motivated principally by a belief that they can reduce recidivism
following convicts’ release, legislators and prison administrators have in recent
years adopted new programs to increase communication and contact between
inmates and their families—in particular, their offspring. 22
Some such programs involve simply more communication between parents
and children. A number of men’s prisons, for example, have introduced parenting
programs that encourage fathers to write letters to their children or record
themselves reading books. 23 A small number of male prisons go beyond normal
visitation procedures to facilitate greater personal contact with children by
allowing more private and extended visits or furloughs (i.e., brief returns of the
inmates to the community). 24
(asserting that “[i]mmediately after delivery, their newborns are automatically placed in
foster care in the vast majority of states”).
20
See, e.g., TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, HARD DATA ON HARD
TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND
VISITATION 9–10 (2004) (finding that 85% of the children of incarcerated women in New
York who are in foster care were in foster care before the mother’s arrest that led to
incarceration), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/245_461.pdf. Cf. infra
notes 62–66 and accompanying text (outlining the legal barriers to state involvement and
the substantial likelihood that other family will care for the children).
21
See infra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
22
See Dave Ghose, Nursery Program Aids Jailed Moms in Four States, STATELINE
(Sept. 24, 2002), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/nursery-program-ai
ds-jailed-moms-in-four-states-85899392756.
23
See, e.g., Rachel D. Costa, Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep: A Look at Overnight
Visitation Rights Available to Incarcerated Mothers, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 67, 92–93 (2003) (describing the D.C. Family Literacy Project, a family
education program for inmates as part of two-step process leading to visits with children);
‘Promising Practices’: Program Helps NM Inmates Be Active Part of Family, DEMING
HEADLIGHT (Nov. 5, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.demingheadlight.com/ci_13715604
(describing the Strengthening Families Initiative Incarcerated Fathers Program, which
provides parenting education classes requiring inmates to create books and cards for their
children).
24
See, e.g., Costa, supra note 23, at 88–89 (describing the park-like area of a
Louisiana penitentiary where fathers can have a picnic and playtime with their children);
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More dramatic new programs have proliferated in women’s prisons. Most
female prisons now have special areas and longer hours for mother-child visits. 25
Many have parenting programs for female inmates that entail young children
spending several hours a week in supervised group play sessions with their
mothers. 26 Some allow furloughs so mothers can spend time with their children in
a more natural, community setting. 27 And some are going further and having
children stay overnight in prisons. For example, the Tennessee Prison for Women
allows inmates to have children under six stay with them for one weekend per
month. 28
B. Prison Nurseries
The most extreme effort to connect incarcerated women with their children is
a fast-growing trend to create prison nurseries, units within prisons where infants
live full-time with their mothers. New York State has operated one at Bedford
Hills, a maximum-security prison forty miles north of New York City, for over a
century. In the mid-twentieth century, a dozen or so other states allowed
incarcerated mothers to keep their children in prison with them, but they
discontinued the practice in the 1970s, a time of increased consciousness regarding
children’s rights, citing concerns about children’s safety and well-being. 29

Brian Handwerk, Mothers Behind Bars: What Happens to the Children?, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/06/0613_030613_pris
onkids.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2004) (describing weekend afternoon programs in
Louisiana women’s prisons).
25
Joycelyn M. Pollack, A National Survey of Parenting Programs in Women’s
Prisons in the U.S., in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 19-6.
26
See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 21 (describing Oregon’s Coffee Creek
Correctional Facility Parenting Inside Out program); Costa, supra note 23, at 89–91, 93–94
(describing family time and model parenting programs in North Carolina, Kansas, and New
York).
27
Pollack, supra note 25, at 19-6 to 19-7.
28
See Jennifer L. Fiorica, Note, How the Constitution Can Preserve the Strength of
Existing Familial Bonds and Foster New Relationships Between Female Inmates and Their
Children, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 49, 53 (2007) (describing overnight visitation
programs in women’s prisons in New York, Delaware, and South Dakota); Erin Quinn,
Women’s Prison Works to Make Inmates Better Mothers, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Nov. 1,
2010.
29
See Paul La Rosa, Babies Behind Bars In 3 New York Prisons, Inmates Who Give
Birth May Keep Their Babies with Them. Dr. Spock Endorsed the Idea, but Critics are
Queasy, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-12/news/vw1747_1_baby-food; see also Leda M. Pojman, Cuffed Love: Do Prison Babies Ever Smile?,
10 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 46, 55 (2001–2002). Pojman notes that a survey in 1981 showed
widely divergent views among prison administrators about the advisability of having
children live in prisons. Id. at 56.
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In recent years, however, the idea of babies living in prison has quietly taken
on new life, as seven states—Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Washington, and West Virginia—have joined New York in operating prison
nurseries, in at least one case with federal funding. 30 Another state, Wyoming, is in
the process of creating one. 31 In some states, prison officials have discretion to
place children in prison with birth mothers even in the absence of a special nursery
unit. 32 The numbers of states, programs, and children living in adult prisons are
likely to increase rapidly. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a call for grant
proposals to develop more prison nursery programs in 2010, 33 advocates advance
prison nursery legislative proposals in additional states each year,34 and a recent
report exclaimed that “unprecedented bi-partisan support currently exists for

30

VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 27–33; Ken Kusmer, Nursery Programs Allow
Imprisoned Moms, Newborns to Bond, SEATTLE TIMES (May 11, 2008), http://seattletimes.
com/html/nationworld/2004405371_apbabiesbehindbars.html (stating that Indiana launched its program of imprisoning babies with a grant from the federal Department of
Health and Human Services). Several states also or instead offer “community treatment
programs” under which a more select group of women with young children leave prison
and live in a more homelike setting while still under state supervision. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3411 (West 2011) (establishing a community treatment program for women
inmates with children under six years old); Rehabilitation Programs Division: Baby and
Mother Bonding Initiative (BAMBI), TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUSTICE, http://www.tdcj.state.tx
.us/divisions/rpd/rpd_bambi.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (describing Texas’s
rehabilitation program, BAMBI, that allows offender mothers and their infants to bond in a
residential facility); see also KAREN SHAIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S MOTHER-INFANT PRISON
PROGRAMS: AN INVESTIGATION 1 (2010) (describing six small, community-based facilities
for mother-child coresidence). But see id. (concluding that “[t]he programs are not
sufficiently ‘child friendly’, with the children’s needs not met”); id. at 19 (noting that some
mothers thought the facilities dangerous for their children). These community-based
programs call for a somewhat different analysis outside this Article’s scope.
31
Sara Hossaini, Plans Underway for New Prison Nursery in Lusk, WYO. PUB.
MEDIA (Mar. 19, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/plans-underway-ne
w-prison-nursery-lusk.
32
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-6-2(g) (2012) (authorizing prison officials to
keep children in prison up to age six); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS., § 9-601(f)
(LexisNexis 2008) (no age limit); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp.
2014) (providing prison officials discretion to keep a child in prison with the mother until
the child reaches age one, except in extenuating circumstances under which the child may
remain until 18-months old).
33
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY-BASED PRISONER SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT
PROGRAM, FY 2010 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT 1 (2010).
34
Connecticut is now poised to join the list of states that place babies in prison. See
H.B. 5569, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2014). In 2011 and 2012, some Massachusetts
legislators proffered a bill relating to incarcerated women that included this provision:
“Every effort shall be made to keep infants of twelve months or less born to incarcerated
mothers with their mothers.” H.B. 2234, 187th Gen. Assemb. (Mass. 2011).
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rehabilitative services for inmates, especially those, like prison nursery programs,
that decrease recidivism.” 35
A child’s life in prison can extend to up to three years of age in Washington
State and up to eighteen months in most of the other states. 36 Most programs
ostensibly limit participation to mothers whose expected release date is before the
child will reach the maximum age, 37 who have no history of convictions for violent
crime or criminal child maltreatment, and who have no recent misbehavior
reports. 38 However, some states do not impose such limitations. 39 Moreover, the
focus on criminal convictions for child abuse in the rules of most prison nursery
programs 40 means the great majority of women who have previously committed
child maltreatment can still have their babies placed in prison with them. Criminal
prosecution for child maltreatment committed by mothers is rare—a substantial
percentage of maltreatment incidents are never reported; in most reported
instances, child protection services (CPS) is unable to substantiate the
maltreatment, CPS refers only about 15% of substantiated maltreatment other than
sexual abuse (which is almost never the kind of maltreatment mothers commit) for
criminal investigation; and only a fraction of cases referred for criminal
35

Lorie Smith Goshin & Mary Woods Byrne, Converging Streams of Opportunity for
Prison Nursery Programs in the United States, 48 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 271, 276
(2009).
36
VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 10. Nebraska prison officials have discretion to
authorize a stay longer than eighteen months. Id. at 28.
37
See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-57 (2005) (stating that a mother’s sentence
must be eighteen months or less).
38
See Tiffany Walden, A Years-Long Struggle for Prison Moms, CITY LIMITS (May
23, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4334/a-years-long-struggle-for-prison-m
oms#.Uu2QpmRDujI.
39
See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2014) (entitling
women to enter the nursery without limitation based on length of sentence); Jessica L.
Borelli et al., Attachment Organization in a Sample of Incarcerated Mothers: Distribution
of Classifications and Associations with Substance Abuse History, Depressive Symptoms,
Perceptions of Parenting Competency and Social Support, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV.
355, 360 (2010) (noting that among mothers in New York prison nurseries included in a
study, “sentences ranged from two months to 10 years”); Mary Woods Byrne et al.,
Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment for Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, 12
ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 375, 380 (2010) (noting that some mothers in New York
prison nurseries have felony convictions for assault, robbery, and/or burglary). Illinois has
no categorical limitations; a committee makes a subjective eligibility determination based
on numerous factors, including length of sentence and behavioral history. See 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.25 (2013).
40
See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-57 (2005) (requiring that an inmate “has
never been convicted of a violent crime or any type of child abuse, or child
endangerment”). Nebraska’s program manual suggests civil child abuse adjudications can
also disqualify a woman. NEB. CORR. CTR. FOR WOMEN, NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS.,
OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM, NURSERY PROGRAM 3 (2012).
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investigation result in a conviction. 41 In addition, states that have rules excluding
women based on their history or length of sentence might not implement them very
carefully. For example, an Ohio report found that a significant percentage of the
children living in prison were mistakenly put there even though their mothers had
histories of violent crime or overly long sentences. 42
Bedford Hills is the only maximum-security prison for women in New York
State, so it houses the most serious female criminals. 43 Its nursery unit can house
twenty-nine mother-baby dyads at a time. 44 While in the program, women attend
parenting classes and substance abuse programs and receive counseling on
preparing for life after release.45 When mothers are receiving these services or
performing prison jobs, other inmates come in from the general population to
provide day care. 46 The most recent report of the nursery residents’ demographics
notes that over 60% of the babies who have begun their lives in Bedford Hills

41

See Ted Cross, Children & Family Research Ctr., U. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign,
The Criminal Justice Response to Child Abuse: Lessons Learned and Future Directions for
Research and Practice, http://cfrc.illinois.edu/pubs/pt_20120701_TheCriminalJusticeResp
onseToChildAbuseLessonsLearnedAndFutureDirectionsForResearchAndPractice.pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014) (presenting national statistics on CPS referrals to law enforcement
for different types of maltreatment, the percentage of referrals that result in prosecution,
and the percentage of prosecutions that result in conviction); see also 55 PA. CODE
§ 3490.92 (2008) (requiring that child protection workers refer cases to prosecutors only if
they are cases of child abuse (not neglect) involving homicide, sexual abuse or
exploitation, or serious bodily injury); Statistics on Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse,
NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/media/rep
orting-on-child-sexual-abuse/statistics-on-perpetrators-of-csa (last visited Mar. 30, 2014)
(noting that only a small percentage of sexual abuse perpetrators are female, including
females who abuse children other than their own); Investigating Child Abuse and Crimes
Against Children in Pennsylvania, PROTECT OUR CHILDREN COMM., http://www.protectpac
hildren.org/files/child-protection-report-investigations-may-2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2014) (quoting child protection officials as saying, “In the vast majority of suspected
physical abuse cases, we are prohibited from contacting law enforcement.”).
42
See TINA L. MAWHORR, OHIO DEP’T REHAB. & CORR., EVALUATION OF THE
ACHIEVING BABY CARE SUCCESS NURSERY PROGRAM 7 (2006) (finding that three out of
seventy women were in the nursery despite not meeting the eligibility criteria).
43
See Facility Listing, N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://www.doc
cs.ny.gov/faclist.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
44
See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 378–79.
45
See Walden, supra note 38 (“Mothers must attend substance abuse programs and
take pre- and post-natal classes, addressing any addictions that put them in prison while
learning how to improve their parenting skills simultaneously.”).
46
See Gilad and Gat, supra note 19, at 375; Leslie Flowers, Prison Babies,
NURSE.COM (Nov. 17, 2008), http://news.nurse.com/article/20081117/NY02/111170078#.
Uuf_5HkQFO0 (describing the vocational programs inmates attend); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
20, § 475.20(f)(2) (2013).
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prison were black and over a quarter were Hispanic, whereas only one tenth were
white. 47
New York law creates a presumption that every woman who delivers a baby
while incarcerated may, if she chooses, 48 keep the baby with her in prison:
A child so born may be returned with its mother to the correctional
institution in which the mother is confined unless the chief medical
officer of the correctional institution shall certify that the mother is
physically unfit to care for the child . . . . A child may remain in the
correctional institution with its mother for such period as seems desirable
for the welfare of such child, but not after it is one year of age, provided,
however, if the mother . . . is to be paroled shortly after the child
becomes one year of age, such child may remain at the state reformatory
until its mother is paroled, but in no case after the child is eighteen
months old. 49
The same New York law allows a woman who is nursing a baby under one
year of age at the time she enters prison to bring the baby with her. 50 The law
applies to “any institution” where a woman is confined, not just to prisons where
there is a special nursery unit. 51
New York law does not limit participation to women whose sentence will end
before the baby must leave the prison, nor does it automatically exclude women
with histories of violence or child maltreatment.52 Moreover, despite the law’s
47

See Joseph R. Carlson Jr., Prison Nurseries: A Pathway to Crime-Free Futures, 34
CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM 17, 18 (2009) (studying the racial demographics of the
mothers and finding that “the female inmates in New York’s programs had the following
demographics: . . . 61 percent were black, 26 percent were Hispanic and 11 percent were
white”).
48
See Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1973) (“[T]he discretion to bring the
child into the institution rests with the inmate mother. . . .”); Mary W. Byrne et al., The
Drew House Story: Collaborating on Alternatives for Incarcerated Women and Their
Children, 28 CRIM. JUST. 25, 26 (2013) (“New York is unique among the seven states that
currently have nursery facilities in that all incarcerated pregnant women have not only the
option but the legislatively protected entitlement (N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611) to use the
prison nursery program unless they are judged unfit for motherhood.”).
49
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2014).
50
Id. § 611(3).
51
Id. § 611(1).
52
See Byrne et al., supra note 48, at 26 (“New York has not established the same
strict eligibility limitations as have other states with prison nursery programs, and
participants are more likely to have a broader range of crimes and sentence lengths than
elsewhere.”); Kelsey Kauffman, Prison Nurseries: New Beginnings and Second Chances,
in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 20-1, 20-4 (stating that officials have placed in
Bedford Hills babies whose birth mothers had long sentences for violent crimes); Natasha
Haverty, When Should Babies Stay with Their Moms in NY Prisons?, N. COUNTRY PUB.
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reference to children’s welfare, there is no legal requirement in New York that an
authority competent to make such a judgment conduct a best-interests assessment
and conclude that imprisonment is the best available alternative for a child, before
the state puts that child in prison, nor that any qualified persons conduct an
ongoing review of the infants’ well-being. 53 Prison administrators conduct the
screening. 54 Thus, regardless of what the circumstances would be for the child, any
prison warden can order transfer of a baby from a birthing facility to the prison to
live with the birth mother for a year or more, if the mother so requests. Even a
petition for custody from the baby’s legal father appears to be insufficient to block
prison officials from sending his child to live in prison. 55
Illinois’s program is typical of the new wave of prison nursery experiments. It
has one nursery, in its Decatur Correctional Center for women. 56 Prison officials
screen inmate applicants to decide which babies will live in the nursery. In Illinois
this is done by subjective assessment taking into account numerous vague criteria
such as length of sentence and nature of criminal history, rather than by applying
categorical limitations.57 The nursery is in a segregated unit, where each mother
has her own room adjoined to a central area decorated and furnished much like a

RADIO (July 15, 2013), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/22352/201307
15/when-should-babies-stay-with-their-moms-in-ny-prisons (discussing a baby living in
Bedford Hills prison with a mother serving a fifteen-year sentence for first-degree
manslaughter).
53
See Kauffman, supra note 52, at 20-1, 20-3 to -4 (stating that the admission
restrictions of the Ohio Reformatory for Women, which exclude violent offenders and
women with previous charges of child endangerment, are not automatically applied to
inmate mothers in New York).
54
See Haverty, supra note 52 (stating that the deputy superintendent of programs
decides which inmates are admitted to the nursery program).
55
See Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (overturning a
decision to exclude a child, stating that “even the father does not have the power under this
statute to countermand the decision of an inmate mother to keep her child”). In contrast,
Illinois regulations require permission of the father, if he is known and available, for a baby
to live in prison. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 475.20(f)(5) (2013).
56
VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 27.
57
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.25(b) (2013) (listing the following criteria: “1)
Sentence, including factors such as the nature and class of the offense, length of sentence,
and sentencing orders. 2) History of violence, abuse, criminal neglect, sexual offenses, or
crimes against children. 3) Outstanding warrants or detainers. 4) Court order prohibiting
contact with children. 5) Department of Children and Family Services involvement,
including, but not limited to, present or past investigations or cases regarding the offender
and her children. 6) Affiliation with organized crime activities or narcotics trafficking. 7)
Mandatory supervised release date. 8) Grade, security designation, and escape risk. 9)
Disciplinary history. 10) Psychological evaluation. 11) Medical or dental health. 12)
Known enemies or documented offenders from whom the offender is to be kept separate.”).
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day care facility. 58 In addition to having superior living arrangements, participants
are relieved from work for weeks after giving birth. 59 But then they must resume
normal prison life, going to work and attending classes, and they must arrange for
other prisoners to care for their children during that time. 60 Mothers are subject to
eviction from the program if they violate any disciplinary rule, program policy, or
staff command, which results in the baby’s immediate and permanent removal
from the prison and thus the baby’s separation from the mother. 61
C. Background Legal Rules for Parentage and Custody
To understand how young children end up living in prisons requires
familiarity with certain background legal rules for parentage and handling of
prison births. State laws confer legal parent status on every child’s birth mother. 62
There is no basis for denying initial legal parent status to her; in particular, there is
no exclusion based on unfitness or incapacity. The state can remove legal parent
status from someone unwilling or unable to care for an offspring under laws
authorizing termination of parental rights (TPR). That almost never happens,
however, as a result of parental incarceration per se 63 because typically, in most
states, child welfare agencies are not involved when a child is born to a woman
already in prison. 64 Instead, absent a nursery program, the baby’s father or, more
commonly, some other family member designated by the mother simply takes the
baby from the prison or birthing facility. 65 The baby then lives in temporary kin
care, subject to reclamation by the mother upon her release.66
58

See Huey Freeman, Illinois Prison Program Guides New Mothers,
PANTAGRAPH.COM (Apr. 12, 2010, 7:47 AM), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/state-andregional/illinois/article_ab1d5106-4631-11df-97d4-001cc4c002e0.html.
59
Id.
60
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.20(f)(2) (2013).
61
Id. at § 475.35; see also NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 40, at 5
(“Involuntary expulsion from the program may result from . . . [d]isregard for rules
established in the Nursery Program/Unit or staff directives.”).
62
See, e.g., 750 ILCS 45/4(1); Ohio R.C. § 3111.02.
63
See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 445–46, 447,
452–60, 463–64 (2008).
64
Cf. LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, WHAT TO PLAN FOR WHEN
YOU ARE PREGNANT AT THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN 12 (2013), available at
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CIW-pregnancy-manua
l-v.-3-6-13.pdf (instructing pregnant inmates that CPS will become involved after the birth
only if no family member shows up at the hospital to take the baby or if the hospital
happens to know the mother is already under CPS investigation or supervision and contacts
CPS); Moses, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that children are rarely placed in foster care as
a result of maternal incarceration).
65
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 551.24(b) (2012) (“Child placement is the inmate’s
responsibility.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-714 (2011 & Supp. 2013) (“The child shall be

2014]

JAILING BLACK BABIES

477

Only in the rare instance that no family member wishes to take the baby does
CPS assume custody, 67 and then the child lives in a foster home until the mother
leaves prison or until CPS orchestrates a TPR and adoption. 68 Federal law requires
that CPS initiate a TPR proceeding if a child has been in nonrelative foster care for
fifteen of the past twenty-two months (the “15/22 rule”), so the rare newborn who
goes into foster care because of maternal incarceration is likely to remain in that
impermanent status for at least a couple of years (fifteen months plus time for the
TPR and adoption processes to run) if the birth mother has a long sentence.69
Several states authorize TPR as to a child in state custody based solely on
incarceration for a particular length of time, including at least two of the states
currently operating prison nurseries. 70 But that can only occur after CPS takes
removed from the state facility . . . and shall be delivered to his father or other member of
his family.”); REPORT CARD, supra note 44, at 12 (noting that in one-fourth of cases, the
father assumes custody).
66
See, e.g., In re M.B., Nos. 11CA010060, 11CA010062, 2012 WL 5899320, ¶3
(Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[A]fter Mother’s release from prison, she
regained legal custody of S.Z.”); Compton v. Eckman, No. 11 MA 94, 2012 WL 1116931,
¶¶51–52 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. Mar. 30, 2012) (ordering transfer of custody from father to
mother after latter’s release from prison, despite mother’s extensive history of drug abuse).
67
See supra note 20.
68
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-714 (“If he is unable to effect the child’s removal
[to a family member] . . . the director of the state facility shall cause the filing of a petition
in the juvenile and domestic relations district court . . . requesting adjudication of the care
and custody of the child . . . .”).
69
See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 435–61 (describing federal law and agency resistance
to its application). Ohio goes further and requires a petition for TPR after twelve months of
foster care within a twenty-two month period. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.413
(LexisNexis 2011).
70
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)(1) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(terminating parental rights when a parent is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional
institution for a period that is expected to be a “substantial portion of the period of time
before the child will attain the age of 18 years”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(r)
(2009 & West Supp. 2013) (authorizing TPR based on a prison sentence of over two years
if the child is in state custody, but only if “prior to incarceration the parent had little or no
contact with the child or provided little or no support for the child.”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12) (West 2005) (authorizing TPR if the parent is incarcerated and
“will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months”); id.
§ 2151.414(E)(5), (13) (authorizing TPR based on incarceration if the imprisonment is the
result of conviction for “an offense committed against the child or a sibling of the child” or
if “[t]he parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the
parent from providing care for the child.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(4) (2004 &
Supp. 2013) (authorizing TPR as to a parent who “[i]s incarcerated and is unavailable to
care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, considering the child’s
age and the child’s need for care by an adult”). A court would probably say this does not
include a woman who just gave birth to the child in question. Wyoming’s TPR statute
includes a provision relating to incarceration that suggests something more is required, but
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custody and only if CPS is motivated to move quickly for termination, which it
generally is not. 71
Thus, the prevailing default rule and practice with newborns whose mothers
are in prison has not been a child-welfare-agency or court determination of what is
the best long-term family placement for them, but rather state empowerment of
incarcerated mothers to choose who will take possession of the children. One
might expect, given that these mothers typically want to be able to collect the child
as soon as they leave prison, that they will choose someone who does not wish to
be a permanent caretaker for the child. A large literature has documented the
adverse outcomes for children in this situation, most of whom are left in poor and
dangerous communities, passed from one overburdened custodian to another and
living under the cloud of having a “real” parent who is an incarcerated criminal. 72
These children are at very high risk for mental health problems, substance abuse,
unintended pregnancy, dropping out of school, gang involvement, chronic
unemployment, and incarceration as adults. 73 The intergenerational cycle is clear. 74

it is unclear what. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) (2013) (authorizing TPR when
“[t]he parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent
is unfit to have the custody and control of the child”).
71
See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 452–57.
72
See infra note 73. Some developmental experts believe, however, that the main
cause of the problems these children manifest is actually the life they had with their
mothers before the mothers went to prison. See, e.g., Joseph Murray & Lynne Murray,
Parental Incarceration, Attachment and Child Psychopathology, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM.
DEV. 289, 303 (2010) (“Given the extreme disadvantage that many children experience
before parental incarceration, it seems unlikely that parental incarceration is the main cause
of psychopathology in this population.”).
73
See e.g., PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 72, at 1–2 (“[F]amilies impacted
by incarceration are already typically at high risk along several dimensions. . . . The
incarceration of a family member may further exacerbate an environment already
characterized by ongoing poverty, stress, or trauma.”); JANE A. SIEGEL, DISRUPTED
CHILDHOODS: CHILDREN OF WOMEN IN PRISON 5–8 (2011) (describing the challenges and
consequences faced by children with parents who are incarcerated); Murray & Murray,
supra note 72, at 303 (“Parental incarceration is a strong predictor of certain symptoms of
child psychopathology.”). See also generally NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE
WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED (2005) (proposing that reform of our criminal
justice system be viewed through the eyes of children whose families are disrupted by
incarceration); DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (discussing how criminal sanctions shape the
lives of criminal offenders’ children); CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS (J. Mark Eddy & Julie Poehlmann
eds., 2010) (summarizing “current research on children whose parents are incarcerated and
discuss[ing] the implications of those findings for policy and intervention”); CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS: THEORETICAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND CLINICAL ISSUES (Yvette
R. Harris et al. eds., 2010) (providing “psychologists, educators, students, researchers, and
policy makers who work with . . . or pursue research on children of incarcerated parents, as
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Evidence from developmental studies suggests the psycho-emotional root of the
problems is the children’s failure to form secure attachments to a permanent
caregiver, resulting from the chaotic life they had with their mothers before their
mothers’ arrests and/or from “unstable caregiving situations during the mothers’
incarceration.” 75
To the extent support for children-in-prison programs has rested on any child
welfare motivation, that support has been a reaction to this tragic reality produced
by the default regime. But the option of placing children in confinement with their
mothers is the only alternative that receives attention. No laws direct prison
officials to encourage mothers to consider relinquishing a baby for adoption, let
alone trigger CPS or court consideration of adoption for the baby, and there is no
evidence that any prison officials or social workers on their own initiative urge
pregnant inmates to consider adoption. They would likely incur recrimination from
women’s advocacy organizations if they did so.
In any event, prison nursery programs will likely foreclose the possibility of
adoption. Women facing a year or more of incarceration who are offered the
opportunity to move to a nicer unit and live with the baby they just delivered are
exceedingly unlikely to decline that opportunity. Moreover, if any female convicts
do contemplate acting altruistically by choosing adoption, to give their babies the
best chance for a happy and fulfilling life, the tremendous push that self-appointed
advocates for women prisoners are now making for children-in-prison programs
suggests that these women would be under tremendous pressure to hold on to their
offspring. They would be pushed to insist on occupying the role of legal mother—
despite any concerns they have about subjecting their babies to the prison
environment and later to the dangers of the communities they came from, despite
the personal struggles that led to their incarceration and that will continue to pose
severe challenges for them after release, and despite the ready availability of good
adoptive homes. 76
well as the frontline responders who provide immediate assistance to these children” with a
“comprehensive source”).
74
See Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: How Poor Women
of Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums,
47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 301–02 (2007) (stating that increased rate of imprisonment
has “ensured the entrapment of African-American women and their children in a continual
cycle of poverty and marginalization from mainstream society” and that “punitive
measures often fail to address the underlying issues of drug addiction, incarceration, and
poverty, essentially paving the way for future generations to suffer a similar fate”). Pfaff,
supra note 5, at 1107 (“incarceration can be a self-sustaining ‘epidemic’”).
75
Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292–97, 303.
76
See JO JONES, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR
CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at
12, 22, 25 tbl.7 (VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS Ser. 23, Nov. 27, 2008) (showing 900,000
women currently seeking to adopt, most of them married, including 228,000 black women
and 195,000 Hispanic women); id. at 16, 33 tbl.15 (showing that over half of these women
express indifference about the race of the child, only one-fifth of white women seeking to

480

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

III. IDEALS AND REALITIES OF CHILDREN-IN-PRISON PROGRAMS
The extraordinary push in recent years to increase children’s presence in
prisons has not come from child welfare organizations. Rather, the force behind
these programs has been individuals and organizations that advocate for prisoners,
women, the poor, or racial minorities in general. 77 These advocates generally
ignore evidence showing that bringing children into prison is contrary to the
children’s welfare, ignore or dismiss the option of adoption, and make unsupported
claims about the positive impacts of these alternative programs. 78
adopt express a preference for a white child, half express a preference for a child less than
two-years old, and 89% would accept a child with a mild disability); id. at 16 (“[I]n
2002 . . . the domestic supply of infants relinquished at birth or within the first month of
life and available to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent.”); Jeff Katz, Adoption’s
Numbers Mystery, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2008, at A17 (“a government agency has found
that there are far more women seeking to adopt children than there are children awaiting
adoption.”).
77
See, e.g., Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 275 (“Feminist criminologists have led
the call for increased gender-responsiveness in correctional facilities. . . . Prison nursery
programs and community-based co-residence facilities are the primary intervention
strategies currently implemented specifically for women under criminal justice supervision
and their infant children.”).
78
See, e.g., Noelle E. Fearn & Kelly Parker, Washington State’s Residential
Parenting Program: An Integrated Public Health, Education, and Social Service Resource
for Pregnant Inmates and Prison Mothers, 2 CAL. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 34, 44 (2004)
(promoting prison nurseries because of “the lack of sufficient placement alternatives” for
the children of the incarcerated women. “The alternative to care from their mothers—such
as placement with grandparents (53%), other relatives (26%), or foster care (10%)—can
come at a great expense to these children and their wellbeing.”); Michal Gilad & Tal Gat,
U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of
Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 383 (2013) (dismissing the
option of adoption by suggesting adoptive homes are not available to newborns who are
black, but citing in support a publication discussing adoptions of older children out of the
foster care system); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 286–88 (devoting over two pages to
the topic: “Policy Alternatives to Prison Nurseries,” but never mentioning adoption);
Kennedy, supra note 18, at 197–200 (opposing TPR of incarcerated mothers); Nicole S.
Mauskopf, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison Nurseries, 5 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 101, 112–15 (dismissing adoption as alternative by citing parents’
constitutional rights); Myrna S. Raeder, Special Issue: Making a Better World for Children
of Incarcerated Parents, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 23, 27 (2012) (dismissing adoption with the
suggestion that children of all ages are difficult to place and psychologically bonded to
extended family); Vainik, supra note 12, at 683 (considering placement with relatives and
foster care as the only alternatives to housing children in prison with their mothers);
Allison Ford, Bonding Behind Bars: Do Prison Nurseries Help or Hinder Parenting?,
DIVINE CAROLINE, http://www.divinecaroline.com/life-etc/culture-causes/bonding-behindbars-do-prison-nurseries-help-or-hinder-parenting (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (“[G]rowing
up on lockdown isn’t the ideal situation for any child. But since the alternative is that kids
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A. The Ideals
The primary motivation for state actors to accede to advocates’ requests for
more programs that bring children into prisons has been the law-and-order and
fiscal aims of preventing criminals from reoffending after they are released from
prison. 79 Most private advocates for children-in-prison programs primarily
manifest sympathy for prison inmates, 80 though they also typically assert that the
programs reduce recidivism. 81 Legal scholarship on the topic is almost entirely
often bounce between foster families or the homes of distant relatives . . . living in a stable
prison environment with their mothers make it a far preferable scenario.”). See also infra
notes 185–191 and 199–253 and accompanying text (discussing unsupported claims
regarding the effect of programs on recidivism and children’s attachment).
79
See, e.g., S.B. 491, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 12,
13, 30; Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 377–78 (“Recidivism, one aspect of maternal
rehabilitation, has been the most commonly used measure of prison nursery program
success. Relationship factors have received no empirical attention until the present
study.”); Carlson, supra note 47, at 17 (“[M]ost [prison nursery programs] have the hope of
reducing the inmate mother’s risk of recidivism . . . .”); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at
273 (“[L]awmakers are providing bi-partisan support for services to incarcerated and
recently released populations, particularly those programs designed to decrease
recidivism.”); Fiorica, supra note 28, at 58 (“Strong family ties can help with rehabilitation
if those bonds remain intact.”); Freeman, supra note 58 (“Prison officials are constantly
frustrated by a revolving door, the seemingly endless supply of inmates returning shortly
after they are released.”); Vainik, supra note 12, at 683; Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut
Female Inmates’ Risk of Reoffending, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids) (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:52 AM),
http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31/prison-nurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending/
(“Prison nurseries are gaining ground because of evidence they reduce recidivism, which
saves the cost of housing repeat offenders.”).
80
See Fearn & Parker, supra note 78, at 45 (noting pregnant inmates’ fear of their
children being placed in foster care and urging expansion of baby-in-prison programs
because “[p]rison nurseries may well serve those women for whom, for whatever reason,
incarceration is an appropriate punishment.”); Vicki Haddock, Babies Behind Bars: With
California Inmates Expected to Give Birth to More than 300 Babies This Year, Officials
Are Preparing to Open the State’s First Prison Nursery, SFGATE.COM, May 14, 2006,
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/BABIES-BEHIND-BARS-With-California-inmates2497061.php; see also Vainik, supra note 12, at 682–83 (suggesting three policies that will
further “humane treatment of incarcerated women,” including prison nurseries).
81
See, e.g., Alexander’s Testimony, supra note 19; SARAH DIAMOND & JASMINE
ORWISH-GROSS, DIAMOND RESEARCH CONSULTING LLC, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS:
POLICY BRIEF FOR CT 1 (2012), available at http://www.diamondresearchconsulting.com/1
74-2/ (citing “the urgent need to lower recidivism rates” in encouraging Connecticut
legislators to approve a prison nursery bill); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 12, 13, 30;
Carlson, supra note 47, at 17–18; Gilad & Gat, supra note 78, at 388 (“There is strong
empirical evidence to support the claim that PNPs can lower rates of recidivism.”); Vainik,
supra note 12, at 682–83; Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 164; VILLANUEVA supra note 1, at
16–17; Haverty, supra note 52 (“[P]articipating in prison nurseries lowers recidivism rates
dramatically . . . .”); Press Release, Women’s Prison Ass’n, New Report: Prison Nursery
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feminist writing, sympathetic to any policies promising to alleviate the perceived
suffering of incarcerated women. 82 This is part of a broader scholarly concern for
incarcerated women, reflected in a large literature characterizing them as victims
of economic injustice and male oppression. This concern also underlies, and calls
for, substantial changes in criminal sentencing, improved societal support for
single mothers and victims of domestic violence, and comprehensive programs to
help incarcerated mothers chart a new course in life. 83 Though that concern is
commendable and that characterization quite plausible, sympathy for the women
appears to blind advocates to the reality of the babies’ needs and the potential
conflict of interests between mothers and their children. Many who advocate
bringing children into prisons blithely assert that it will benefit the children by
enabling them to form a secure attachment to their birth mother—a crucial aspect
of healthy child development that I discuss below. 84 This might be important to
some because they care about children and to others because of the well-known
phenomenon of children following their parents’ criminal path, the “cradle to
prison pipeline.” 85 But the programs have arisen without any empirical support for

Programs a Growing Trend in Women’s Prisons (July 13, 2009) (on file with Utah Law
Review) (quoting a policy associate at the Women’s Prison Association as saying “the
research shows that these programs produce lower rates of recidivism among participating
mothers”).
82
See e.g., Kennedy, supra note 18, at 166 (characterizing separation of convicted
mothers from their children as a “call to action for feminists interested in dismantling
stereotypes about women, mothering, race, and poverty”); Vainik, supra note 12, at 680–
81, 683 (arguing, based on women’s rights, for more programs in which children live with
convicted mothers and other reforms that benefit incarcerated mothers).
83
See generally, e.g., BARBARA BLOOM ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., GENDERRESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN
OFFENDERS (2003); INTERRUPTED LIFE: EXPERIENCES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES (Rickie Solinger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INTERRUPTED LIFE]; JODY
RAPHAEL, FREEING TAMMY: WOMEN, DRUGS, AND INCARCERATION (2007); PAULA C.
JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON (2003);
MADONNA R. MAIDMENT, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: DECONSTRUCTING THE
BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY (2006); Sally Day, Mothers in Prison: How the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 Threatens Parental Rights, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 217 (2005);
Marie A. Failinger, Lessons Unlearned: Women Offenders, the Ethics of Care, and the
Promise of Restorative Justice, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 487 (2006); George, supra note 8;
see also Levy-Pounds, supra note 74, at 301–02; Tiffany Scott, Repercussions of the
“Crack Baby” Epidemic: Why a Message of Care Rather than Punishment is Needed for
Pregnant Drug-Users, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 203, 216 (2006).
84
See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 30.
85
See Susan Phillips, Mother-Child Programs: Connecting Child Welfare and
Corrections Agencies, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 22-2 (“Another reason for
the growing interest in programs of this nature is their potential for preventing children
whose mothers are incarcerated from following in their mothers’ footsteps.”).
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this assertion regarding children’s welfare, 86 which makes it appear disingenuous,
or, at best, as wishful thinking. As discussed below, the first study of attachment
outcomes for prison nursery babies in the U.S. was published in 2010, even though
the Bedford Hills prison nursery has existed for over a century. 87 The only studies
of child welfare impact available to the seven states that created prison nurseries in
the fifteen years before 2010, therefore, would have been a 1980s study of child
development in United Kingdom prison nurseries—which found “progressive
developmental decline in motor and cognitive scores . . . for all nursery infants
after admission to the unit” 88—and two observational studies of the Bedford Hills
program in the early 1990s that found physical and cognitive developmental delays
in a large percentage of the children. 89 Moreover, this unsupported child welfare
speculation typically operates against a background assumption that the only
alternative for a child is the current default regime of “bouncing around” among
relatives or spending childhood in foster care. 90 But that is clearly false, given that
the number of Americans wishing to adopt an infant far exceeds the number of
infants currently available for adoption, 91 as well as the fact that children adopted
soon after birth have developmental outcomes as good as or better than the general
population and far better than children raised in the types of homes and
communities from which most incarcerated women come. 92 Adoption could also
86

Cf. Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276 (“Data regarding child-specific
outcomes . . . have rarely been collected.”); id. at 277 (“Research assessing US outcomes
other than recidivism is nascent.”); Pojman, supra note 29, at 61 (“[R]esearch specifically
measuring the long-term impact of nurseries on children is virtually non-existent . . . .”).
87
See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 377–78, 386; Flowers, supra note 46 (“Prior to
Byrne’s research, no one had formally studied the impact of the prison nursery on an
infant’s development.”).
88
Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 277.
89
See Pojman, supra note 29, at 65–66. These reports do not appear to be available
anymore, which might mean the American Medical Association withdrew them, perhaps
because of flaws, but they were available to policy makers at least as recently as 2001. Id.
at 51 n.41.
90
See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L.
REV. 793, 868–74 (2011) (considering several ways to avoid separating parents from
children, but not adoption); Bill Hewitt & Margaret Nelson, Mothers Behind Bars, PEOPLE,
Nov. 11, 1996, at 95 (reporting an interview with a Nebraska prison warden who stated that
prison nurseries are less expensive than placing a child in foster care); Vainik, supra note
12, at 683–84 (stating that although putting babies in prison “might not be the optimal
scenario,” it is better than placing children in foster care or with relatives).
91
See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 428–35 (“children are readily adoptable immediately
after birth, but their chances for adoption diminish steadily from that point on . . . .”).
92
See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE
PARENTS 7 (2009) (stating that most children privately adopted were under one month of
age at time of placement); id at 21–35 (providing comparative statistics for all children in
the United States versus privately adopted children with respect to physical health, social
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allow a child to begin life with two parents in a loving, mutually supportive
relationship with each other, rather than with a single parent. 93 Encouraging these
women to relinquish their babies for adoption, or terminating their rights
involuntarily and immediately to clear the way for adoption, 94 would, as shown
further below, give these babies a far better chance at a good upbringing with
permanent, stable, capable caregivers. But prison nursery advocates never consider
these possibilities.
In any case, the ideal depicted by advocates for prison nurseries, and the
expectation of legislators and prison officials who approve them, is this: The state
will place newborns into prison with the birth mothers. As a consequence of this
close and supervised contact, the children will form a secure attachment to their
mothers. The children will then leave the prison with their mothers. The mothers
will thereafter refrain from criminal conduct (including substance abuse) and will
remain the custodians of the children throughout their minority, consistently
providing safe, stable, and suitable home for the children.

and emotional well-being, and relationship with parents); id at 46 (showing 41% of private
adoptions were by relatives, which likely skews well-being statistics downward for this
group of children); Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System:
Effective Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2012) (noting that “the adoptive parent maltreatment rate is
lower than the norm for the general population”); Dwyer, supra note 63, at 434 (noting the
predominance of substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal records among parents
whose children suffer maltreatment and developmental problems); Jacqueline Y. Portello,
The Mother-Infant Attachment Process in Adoptive Families, 27 CANADIAN J. COUNSELING
177, 178–79 (1993) (summarizing studies finding no difference in attachment results as
between children raised by biological parents and children placed with adoptive parents in
the first six months of life).
93
On the traditional preference adoption agencies give to married applicants and the
child welfare benefits of two-parent households, see generally Lynn D. Wardle, Preference
for Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD.
345 (2003); Who Can Adopt?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/who-can-a
dopt-child-30291.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (“Agencies often ‘reserve’ healthy infants
and younger children for two-parent families”).
94
In some states, statutory amendment might be necessary to accomplish an
immediate TPR based on incarceration per se. In others, it is already possible. See, e.g.,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414(E)(12)–(13) (authorizing TPR based on a prison sentence
of greater than eighteen months or on repeated incarceration); S.D. Codified Laws § 268A-26.1 (authorizing TPR based on a finding that a parent is “incarcerated and is
unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority,
considering the child’s age and the child’s need for care by an adult”). In addition, in every
state other circumstances in the lives of incarcerated women can serve as a legal basis for
immediate TPR, such as a prior TPR as to another child. See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 438.
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B. The Realities
Without knowing much about the programs or studies on the effects of
bringing children into prisons, one might suppose there are good and bad aspects
for children. While in prison, they get more time with their biological mothers, and
the parents might be more attentive than they would be at home. On the other
hand, prisons are typically unhappy, stressful, and dangerous places where most
nonincarcerated parents would likely never bring their own children for any
reason.
1. Mothers’ Incapacity
As to the positive dimension of children being with their birth mothers rather
than in the care of someone who is not in prison, one must bear in mind that
incarcerated women are generally not well functioning, psychologically healthy
people who happen to land in prison one day because of aberrational misconduct.95
To the contrary, the great majority of these women suffer from deep, serious
mental health problems and addictions and have been involved in criminal activity
for a long time. 96 Most had very poor upbringings themselves—a large portion
having suffered from physical or sexual abuse as children—and never developed a
secure attachment to their own parents. 97 Dysfunction typically runs through the
95

The frequent claim that a large portion of the prison population consists of people
who committed minor drug offenses is false. See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and
Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 175 (2013) (“[G]iven the consensual nature of
drug crimes, they are underreported and police choose to apprehend only about 10% of
drug users.”); Pfaff, supra note 5, at 1096 (“Relatively few drug arrests result in
incarceration . . . .”).
96
See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (finding a history of substance abuse in most
women in the New York prison nursery programs); Jude Cassidy et al., Enhancing
Attachment Security in the Infants of Women in a Jail-Diversion Program, 12
ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 333, 334 (2010) (noting “65 to 94% of pregnant inmates
report histories of substance abuse” and “the majority of pregnant inmates report
depressive symptomatology at levels indicative of clinical depression”); Lili Garfinkel,
Female Offenders and Disabilities, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 39-1, 39-3
(“[T]he typical female offender had been hospitalized at least once for a psychiatric
episode (usually a suicide attempt), had been violent in a school setting, and had a
diagnosis of ODD (oppositional-defiant disorder). Because of girls’ histories of abuse and
violence it is likely that they also have abuse-related disorders such as PTSD.”); Diane S.
Yough & Liete C. Dennis, The Complex Needs of Mentally Ill Women in County Jails, in
WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 42-1, 42-2 to 42-3 (noting that the “vast majority . . .
had previously been in psychiatric and/or alcohol or drug treatment” and “[t]wo-thirds . . .
had received psychiatric medication in the past”).
97
See REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 9 (“Rather than being treated for trauma,
depression, addiction, and the other indelible injuries of violence, these mothers have been
displaced into the criminal justice system.”); Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 386 (“[M]any
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families of incarcerated women; for example, most of these women have parents or
siblings who have been incarcerated, 98 and nearly half had parents who abused
alcohol or drugs. 99 Many grew up in foster care. 100 When sentenced to prison, twothirds had prior convictions, 101 and most were abusing drugs. 102 Furthermore,
victims of domestic violence comprise a large percentage of female inmates, 103 and
one-third of incarcerated women have been raped before entering prison. 104 One
inmate, in the documentary film Mothers of Bedford Hills, stated, “[W]e’re all sick
and broken when we enter these gates, or we wouldn’t be here.”105 Having
sympathy for and desire to improve life for these women is entirely understandable
and commendable. Unfortunately, this sickness and brokenness prevents adequate
parenting 106—in fact, more than a third of incarcerated women who were already
mothers were not living with their children at the time of their arrest.107
Imprisonment temporarily removes these women from the home environment
that produced their dysfunctions, and it mostly curtails their substance abuse. It
of the women in our sample did have mental health needs including depressive
symptomatology.”); id at 381–82 (finding that among thirty maternal research subjects only
one-third had attached securely to their own parents in childhood); Cassidy et al., supra
note 96, at 334 (reporting that 60% of pregnant inmates “experienced family violence
during childhood” and “24% reported experiencing sexual abuse before adulthood”);
Failinger, supra note 83, at 501 (noting “highly disproportionate incidence of childhood
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse that is found among female offenders”); Makariev &
Shaver, supra note 11, at 312, 318; Malika Saada Saar, Mothers Behind Bars in the United
States: A Human Rights Issue, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/malika-saada-saar/a-report-card-on-mothers-_b_774338.html (“The shared narrative arc of incarcerated women and mothers behind bars is that of repeated experiences of
brutal sexual and physical victimization, generally begun during girlhood.”).
98
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 7.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 22; Murray & Murray, supra note 70, at 300 (noting that 46% had a prior or
current conviction for a violent offense).
102
Id.
103
Failinger, supra note 83, at 493–94 (“[W]omen’s . . . relationships with men in
their lives, profoundly affects the behavior that lands them in the criminal justice system.
Covington has described how dysfunction in women offenders’ relationship leads to drug
abuse and other crime.”); Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility
for Black Female Inmates, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 804–11 (2004).
104
See Alysia Santo, Raped Behind Bars: New York Prisons Have A Problem: A Fox
Guarding the Henhouse, TIMESUNION.COM, (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.timesun
ion.com/local/article/Raped-behind-bars-4795883.php.
105
MOTHERS OF BEDFORD HILLS (Covey Productions Apr. 2011).
106
See Byrne et al., supra note 47, at 27 (“[I]mprisoned pregnant women are, not
unexpectedly, poor candidates for bonding and attachment with their infants.”); Cassidy et
al., supra note 96, at 334 (“The multiple psychosocial problems presented by pregnant
inmates have been well-established as risk factors for poor parenting.”).
107
Id. at 30.
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does not, however, cure them of deep-seated problems nor alter the environment to
which they are likely to return after release. 108 To the contrary, “[w]omen go to
prison often with an already severe complex of problems, which, without adequate
treatment, the harsh conditions of prison tend to exacerbate.” 109 Imprisonment adds
stressors of its own that intensify psychopathologies. 110 Human rights
organizations complain that prison life today remains “harsh and dehumanizing for
all who are confined.” 111 The physical environment in prisons is generally stifling,
harsh, unstimulating, and foreboding. 112 The social environment is rife with
hostility, fear, and depression. 113 The prison setting denies women autonomy and

108

See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 21 (“Most correctional interventions do not
address the effects of early physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and the resulting
trauma.”); Gina McGalliard, Record Numbers of Incarcerated Mothers Bad News for
Women, Children, and Communities, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://truth-out.
org/news/item/5871-record-numbers-of-incarcerated…rs-bad-news-for-women-children-co
mmunities?tmpl=component&print=1 (quoting the Executive Director of the Women’s
Prison Association, Georgia Lerner, who said that “going to prison fails to address the
underlying factors that led to incarceration in the first place”). Many advocates for
incarcerated women bemoan the lack of adequate medical care, mental health treatment,
counseling, and drug rehabilitation. See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4; Vainik, supra
note 12, at 676–77.
109
Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 142; id. at 145 (“Women come into prison with a
lifetime of unmet needs in health care, education, and vocational training. The experience
of incarceration exacerbates these issues in potentially dangerous ways . . . .”); Baradon et
al., New Beginnings—An Experience-Based Programme Addressing the Attachment
Relationship Between Mothers and their Babies in Prisons, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOTHERAPY
240, 242 (2008) (“We assume that many troubling aspects of the mothers’ histories are
activated by the prison environment, thereby creating major problems for the establishment
of caregiving bonds.”).
110
See John J. Gibbs, Symptoms of Psychopathology Among Jail Prisoners: The
Effects of Exposure to the Jail Environment, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 288, 307 (1987)
(suggesting “going to jail can substantially increase the severity of some symptoms of
psychopathy”); Ruthanne DeWolfe & Alan S. DeWolfe, Impact of Prison Conditions on
the Mental Health of Inmates, 4 S. ILL. U. L.J. 497, 533 (1979) (discussing the negative
effects maximum security prison systems have on the psychological health of inmates and
proposing solutions to this problem).
111
See Saar, supra note 97.
112
See, e.g., Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty.
1979) (stating as a factor in assessing the child’s welfare interests “the effect that
institutionalization would have on the child after the first few months, considering the
constriction on movement and the sterility of environment”); id. at 656 (characterizing the
prison as “an unsuitable environment” for a child).
113
See Christina Jose-Kampfner, Coming to Terms with Existential Death: An
Analysis of Women’s Adaptation to Life in Prison, 17 SOC. JUST. 110, 115−19 (1990)
(discussing the emotional experiences of women serving long prison sentences and
comparing those experiences to the terminally ill); La Rosa, supra note 29, at 2−3
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privacy, as they are constantly under the authoritarian control of prison guards and
surrounded by people who also committed crimes and have deep-seated
psychological problems. 114 Inmate-on-inmate sexual violence is actually four times
higher in female prisons than in male prisons. 115
Living in a nursery unit is certainly more comfortable for inmates, but it is
still life in a prison (in fact, the women typically spend much of their day outside
the nursery unit amidst the general population 116), and it can entail different
stressors. For example, other prisoners are likely to resent women who receive
special treatment because of their children, and prison nurseries entail the
additional tension arising from babies’ uncontrolled noise, especially during the
night. 117 Many incarcerated women, both those in nursery units and those in
normal units, describe prison life as socially and emotionally isolating, entailing
complete severance of ties with family and friends and conditions not conducive to
forming positive new ties, which compounds their struggles with depression, guilt,

(discussing various arguments for why incarcerated mothers should not be allowed to raise
their newborn children in prison).
114
See, e.g., Amy Littlefield, Mothers Behind Bars: The Prison Birth Project Helps
Women in Prison with Pregnancy, Delivery and Parenting, VALLEY ADVOCATE (June 24,
2010) (relating inmate’s description of “[t]he structure of life in the jail—the strip searches,
the uniformed guards, the heavily controlled schedule, the medications used to sedate her—
made [the inmate] feel stripped of her right to be an emotional person. ‘It’s really
humiliating having to face the guards that watch you strip every day . . . . You don’t have
that personal, private thing anymore. . . . You have nothing. You are a number . . . . You
have no right to feel, no emotions, no opinions, you have nothing. You do and say what
you’re told to do. That’s it.”’).
115
See ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–
2012, at 17−18 (2013).
116
See Fiorica, supra note 28, at 58; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
117
See, e.g., Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty.
1979) (noting Sheriff’s concern that the effect of babies’ presence on other inmates could
create a “security hazard”); Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (Sup. Ct. Tioga Cnty,
1973) (“The Sheriff . . . complains that the jail morale will be lowered in that others so
confined are not allowed to have their families in jail and that the child’s crying will disturb
the other prisoners.”); La Rosa, supra note 29 (stating that a constant source of tension in
nursery units comes from babies crying during the night).
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and sense of loss. 118 Many are preoccupied with thoughts of children and men left
behind. 119
Prison guards use their power over female inmates to inflict psychological and
sexual abuse. 120 Rape of incarcerated females is a widespread problem in many
states. 121 Reporting rape or any other abuse typically results in the accuser’s being
put in solitary confinement. That potential punishment, along with difficulty of
proof, officials’ lack of sympathy for criminals, and a code of secrecy, give guards
near impunity. 122 A prison guard is not likely to become kind and nurturing just
because an inmate has a baby with her. 123
A study of New York’s two prison nurseries found “crowded conditions and
negative interactions with corrections officers and nursery staff. Mothers expressed
strain related to parenting in a demanding environment in which they felt basic

118

See Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 118−19; Quinn, supra note 28, at 2 (“As
she struggles to mourn for her daughter in an atmosphere where she has no true friends
among the other inmates, she believes she is not worthy of being a parent.”); see also Lorie
S. Goshin & Mary W. Byrne, Predictors of Post-Release Research Retention and
Subsequent Reenrollment for Women Recruited While Incarcerated, 35 RES. IN NURSING &
HEALTH 94, 95 (2012) (“Social networks, frayed prior to criminal justice contact, can be
further damaged by incarceration.”).
119
See, e.g., Paul Vallely, Mothers & Prison: Babies Behind Bars, INDEPENDENT
(U.K.) (Sept. 17, 2012), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
mothers--prison-babies-behind-bars-8143296.html.
120
See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 25−26; Santo, supra note 104, at 1
(describing pervasive problem of inmate abuse in New York State’s women’s prisons);
Critical Statistics: California Women’s Prisons, CAL. COALITION FOR WOMAN PRISONERS,
http://www.womenprisoners.org/resources/critical_statistics.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014)
(“It is in this powerless environment that some prisoners have endured sexual assault from
guards.); id. (reporting that “71% of women in California prisons report experiencing
continual physical abuse by guards or other prisoners”; “[p]ersistent privacy violations are
a fact of life for women in California prisons”; “male guards observe female inmates at all
times—while taking showers, dressing, going to the bathroom and being strip searched”;
and prisoners endure “degrading and sexually explicit language and frequent harassment
from guards” and risk retaliation from the guards if they report any such abuse).
121
See Santo, supra note 104 (reporting the pervasive problem of sexual abuse in
New York women’s prisons); Kelsey Meany, Former Inmates Claim Texas Prison Ran
‘Rape Camp’, DAILY BEAST (June 20, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
witw/articles/2013/06/19/former-inmates-claim-texas-prison-ran-rape-camp.html.
122
See Meany, supra note 121; Alysia Santo, Hidden World of Official Silence, TIMES
UNION (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Hidden-world-o
f-official-silence-4795871.php.
123
Cf. REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 13 (“Reports from mothers with children in
prison nurseries indicate that their babies’ close proximity allows prison staff to coerce and
manipulate a mother by threatening to deny her access to her baby.”); Vainik, supra note
12, at 681 (expressing concern about women’s powerlessness with prison guards and
officials).
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care giving, like feeding their infant, was tightly controlled.”124 In fact, guards
have especially great power over the women in prison nurseries, because any
report of misconduct or harm to a baby could get a mother immediately ejected
from the program and separated from her baby. 125 A woman at Bedford Hills
confessed to concealing her son’s broken kneecap for some time because she knew
reporting his fall out of a crib would result in his removal from the prison. 126
2. Unhealthy Environment
The same conditions that exacerbate inmates’ psychological and personality
problems are also likely to affect children adversely, both directly—by exposing
them to the same hostile and stifling atmosphere—and indirectly—by disturbing
their caregivers. In most nursery programs, babies come into contact not just with
other mother-child pairs but also with inmates who do not have a child with them
in prison, either because these other inmates serve as day care workers or because
the babies live in a unit that contains inmates who do not have children with
them. 127 Such contact with other inmates increases risk of harm and disease. 128 In
some prisons, inmates have access to drugs, 129 and women in the nursery who
know or suspect the guards are going to have them ejected are likely to act in a

124

Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 278 (citing Katherine Gabel & Kathryn Girard,
Long-Term Care Nurseries in Prison: A Descriptive Study, in CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 237, 253 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995); R.
Barry Ruback & Timothy S. Carr, Crowding in a Woman’s Prison: Attitudinal and
Behavioral Effects, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 57, 57−59 (1984) (discussing the adverse
impact of crowded conditions, lack of privacy, and lack of control).
125
See MAWHORR, supra note 43, at 7 (reporting study showing 15% of mothers in
Ohio’s prison nursery were ejected for rule infraction or inattention to their babies); SHAIN
ET AL., supra note 30, at 17 (discussing mothers’ fear of retaliation by guards for anything
that displeases them, causing some to forego asking for medical attention for their sick or
injured children); see also Baradon et al., supra note 109, at 242 (“[T]he officer-prisoner
relationship may easily trigger a negative transference underpinned by unresolved conflicts
within their own child-parent relationship.”).
126
Tracy Murphy, Mom: Having Son in Prison Was Scary, Beautiful, HLN VIDEOS,
http://www.hlntv.com/video/2013/06/03/babies-behind-bars (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
127
See Kauffman, supra note 52, at 20-5 (noting that different prisons have different
conceptions of the role of the nursery in the wider prison community and that children are
exposed to other “program mothers and the inmate caregivers”).
128
See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 94 (noting a “higher prevalence of . . .
mental illness, substance use disorders, hepatitis, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually
transmitted infections” among incarcerated women).
129
See, e.g., Laura Stone, Women Behind Bars: A Baby’s Home Behind the Barbed
Wire, CALGARY HERALD (May 25, 2012) http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/alberta/Wo
men+Behind+Bars+baby+home+behind+barbed+wire/5540938/story.html (citing prison
employees’ position that “drugs proliferate” in the prison and “violence is on the rise”).
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volatile manner and could become very violent. 130 The physical atmosphere is also
unhealthy, as evidenced by elevated rates of respiratory problems among
inmates. 131 Tellingly, many prison nursery programs require mothers to sign
waivers absolving the prison of responsibility for harm to or medical problems
with their babies. 132
Anyone who has ever entered a federal or state prison in the United States
must be aware that the environment is dramatically different from that outside, and
that difference principally explains the age limits in prison nursery programs,
because administrators fear it would be detrimental to a child to be aware of his or
her surroundings in prison. 133 But children are affected by their physical and social
environments even before they have conscious conceptual awareness or
understanding of them, regardless of whether they will remember the experience.
Infant brains process information from their environments intensely, and
experiences even in the earliest days of life can psychologically affect a child
throughout life. 134 Although prison officials endeavor to make nursery units more
pleasant, they are still units in a prison—populated by prison inmates, controlled
by prison guards, subject to the strict prison regimentation, and very limited in
both space and variety of experiences. A team of child development experts
summarized concerns about children’s well-beings in prison nurseries:
Prison is by definition a very constraining institution. . . .
. . . Living space is reduced and children often share small cells with
their mothers. This spatial shrinking is in contradiction with a child’s
needs to move, to discover his environment and to be surrounded by a
rich and diversified milieu.
Prison also imposes strict temporal constraints. Activities take place
in rigid and regulated sequences. . . . While regularity is a good thing for
a child, it goes too far in prison . . . .
130

See, e.g., id. (describing an incident in a Canadian prison in which a woman, after
learning her child had been removed because the woman refused a drug test, took a guard
hostage).
131
See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 94 (noting that inmates suffer a higher rate
of asthma compared to nonincarcerated persons).
132
See VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 9.
133
Id.; Vallely, supra note 119 (noting that Britain generally does not permit mothers
to keep their children in prison mother-baby units after they reach eighteen months because
“[a]fter that, child development experts say, the harmful effects of being in an institution
start to outweigh the benefits of being with their mother”).
134
See Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separation and Reunification: Using Attachment
Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the Placements of Children in Foster
Care, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 8 (2004). (“Infants are capable of recalling experiences from
the first days of life. . . . The memories are largely perceptual and are encoded through
touch and sound. . . . [E]ven years following an event, though inaccessible to
consciousness, the memory may still influence the child’s behavior and physiological
responses.”).
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Social deprivation is evident . . . . Cut off from the outside world,
human exchanges are limited to the same people, prisoners and guards,
most of whom are women. The hierarchical prison structure also imposes
restrictions. Prisoners are at the bottom of the ladder and stay there.
Personal autonomy is discouraged and various controls discourage
responsible behavior. A mother is generally not allowed to freely care for
her child. . . . [S]he is dependent on prison personnel who monitor her
continuously. . . . [S]urveillance per se generates stress and anxiety.
....
. . . Living conditions in prison, where stress levels are high both in
the milieu as well as in the mother’s subjective world, diminish her
protective capacities and her ability to set aside the vicissitudes of her
personal life, her mood variations, her anxieties, etc. . . . [T]his
constitutes a serious risk factor for the child.
. . . Neither [mother nor child] can escape the other’s frustrations
and mood swings, perhaps contributing to . . . simultaneous apathy and
nervousness.
....
. . . [M]other-child proximity in prison . . . acts as a brake in the
child’s autonomization process.
....
. . . Indeed, constraints imposed on their relationship limits the
possibility of separation and the emergence of symbolic representation
which is one of the basic instruments of cognitive development. 135
In addition, infants confined to a prison unit for months and even years are
deprived of a wide array of experiences that ordinarily stimulate cognitive,
emotional, and physical development in children. 136 A mother who left Bedford
Hills with her seventeen-month-old daughter described how the girl “freaked out”
at seeing blowing leaves and was “petrified of cars,” never having experienced
either before. 137 In addition, the only males that infants in prison nurseries observe
are prison guards, who treat the female inmates in an authoritarian and often
abusive manner. 138
135

Philip D. Jaffé et al., Children Imprisoned with their Mothers: Psychological
Implications, in ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
402−04 (Santiago Redondo et al. eds., 1997).
136
See Flowers, supra note 46, at 2 (noting the results of study of prison nursery
children in which “[s]ocial and emotional screening in toddlerhood showed high scores for
potential problems”); Vallely, supra note 119 (describing “[a] sterile life” for infants inside
a prison).
137
Tracy Murphy, Mom: Having my Daughter in Prison Motivated Me, HLN (June 4,
2013), http://www.hlntv.com/video/2013/06/04/prison-moms-babies.
138
See Santo, supra note 104; Kelly Virella, Male Guards, Female Inmates and
Sexual Abuse in NYS Prisons, CITY LIMITS (May 3, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/
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The concern is not limited to residential programs. Just visiting a parent in
prison can be upsetting for children because of the prison’s ominous environment,
hostile guards and inmates, harsh procedures, and radical disempowerment of the
parent. 139 A recent study found “visitation during a mother’s incarceration
predicted less child attachment security.” 140 Many custodians of children in the
community, whose mothers are in prison, object to visits because they believe,
often based on past experience, that entering the prison environment will
traumatize the children. 141 Many courts, also citing concern about the
psychological impact visiting a prison may have on children, have refused to issue
orders sought after by prisoners that would require a child’s caretaker to bring the
child to prison for visitation. 142 Many prison officials likewise express this
worry. 143 Even many mothers in visitation or nursery programs themselves voice
the view that prison is no place for children and their worries about the impact that
the prison environment might have. 144 One mother, whose son spent some
weekends with her in a Tennessee prison, stated that “she hopes his 2-year-old
brain isn’t capable of remembering his formative years in prison.” 145
Few advocates for placing children in prisons acknowledge, let alone address
the implications of, the potential harms to children from entering such a tense,
stressful, antagonistic, demoralizing, and stifling environment. 146 Some aim to
articles/4325/male-guards-female-inmates-and-sexual-abuse-in-nys-prisons#.UnkXe-KzL5.
139
See Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 294–95; Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny
of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental
Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 216 (2004).
140
See Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320 (emphasis in original).
141
See Costa, supra note 23, at 83–85; Vainik, supra note 12, at 679.
142
See Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAM. L.Q.
191, 201–05 (2006); see also Standard Pa. Practice § 126:1078 (2012) (indicating there is a
“presumption that visitation with an incarcerated parent is not in the best interests of the
child”).
143
See Mauskopf, supra note 78, at 110–11; Vainik, supra note 12, at 683 (“[P]rison
administrators adamantly feel that children do not belong in prisons . . . .”); Clare Dyer,
Prisons Consider More Baby Units, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2000, 10:02 PM), http://www.the
guardian.com/uk/2000/aug/30/prisonsandprobation.society (quoting a representative of the
Prison Reform Trust in the U.K. as saying, “In trying to do the right thing the prison
service is in danger of making things worse. Prison is not a place for children.”).
144
See, e.g., Handwerk, supra note 24 (incarcerated mothers state “prison is no place
for kids”); La Rosa, supra note 29 (noting that “inmates complain of the peeling paint,
roaches, and bad plumbing”); Walden, supra note 38 (noting that some incarcerated
mothers and critics say “prison is not an appropriate environment for children and that
living in prison may have harmful effects on the child later in life”).
145
Quinn, supra note 28.
146
The few advocates for incarcerated women who do acknowledge the harms do so
in support of transferring inmates to community-based facilities to be with their children.
E.g., Abramowicz, supra note 90, at 872–73 (discussing community-based facilities as a

494

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

bolster their position by cagily asserting that adverse effects on children have not
been shown 147 while failing to mention that there has been almost no effort among
child development researchers to study the effects on children. 148 Some rely on an
assertion that the prison environment is better than the neighborhoods the mothers
came from. 149 Although this is likely true in some respects (e.g., less violence and
drug abuse in prison), they overlook the reality that women exiting prison almost
always return to wherever they came from, and these advocates studiously avoid
the topic of adoption, a far more attractive option for newborns than either the
default regime or prison.
3. Improbability of Attachment
A crucial empirical claim many advocates assert is that, despite any
adversities in the prison environment, a child will form a secure attachment with
the mother that will constitute a basis for a healthy and permanent mother-child
relationship. 150 Yet there is no evidence that visitation programs accomplish
this, 151 and what little evidence there is of outcomes for former prison nursery
babies suggests that only a small percentage meet this expectation. As explained
below, available evidence suggests children-in-prison programs are actually more
likely to undermine attachment and produce even worse outcomes than the default
regime. By this measure, prison nurseries are a failure for the vast majority of
children and a reckless gamble for all.
“place for mothers . . . to live with their children and avoid the separation and trauma that
the mother’s incarceration in a prison facility would inflict on the child”); Pollack, supra
note 25, at 19-7 (noting that furloughs avoid subjecting children “to the negative and
frightening elements of a prison visit”); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that a
community-based nursery is “far better situated to serve the unique physical and emotional
needs of a mother and her child” than is a prison nursery).
147
See, e.g., Alexander’s Testimony, supra note 19; An Act Establishing a Child
Nursery Facility at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic: Hearing on H.B.
6642 Before the Judiciary Comm. (Conn. 2013) (testimony of Civic Trust Public Lobbying
Co. in support of Conn. H.B. No 6642).
148
See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276–77 (“Data regarding child-specific
outcomes after participation in a nursery program are also critical endpoints but have rarely
been collected. . . . Research assessing US outcomes other than recidivism is nascent.”).
149
See, e.g., Suzanne Smalley, Should Female Inmates Raise Their Babies in Prison,
NEWSWEEK (May 13, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/should-female-inmatesraise-their-babies-prison-80247 (“A prison may not seem like the best place to raise
infants. But researchers are finding that it’s better than the alternative.”).
150
See VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 22 (“[P]romoting maternal attachment is a
primary argument for the creation of prison nurseries.”); Kusmer, supra note 30; Pojman,
supra note 29, at 60 (“Mother-child bonding and attachment are at the crux of the prison
nursery debate.”).
151
See Mary W. Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100
Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 77, 78 (2012).
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Attachment is a child’s psychological identification with and emotional
connection to a permanent caregiver. Secure attachment is the foundation for
healthy child development and appropriate social and emotional functioning later
in life. 152 Children who fail to form a secure attachment “tend to see the world as
threatening and unpredictable” 153 and consequently “have difficulties with anxiety,
anger, aggression, depression, and mental disorganization.” 154 These psychological
effects in turn lead to deficiencies in physical health and development, “cognitive
problems, speech and language delays, sensory integration difficulties and . . .
social and behavioral abnormalities.” 155 Attachment failure “retards socioemotional development and produces emotional withdrawal, indiscriminate socializing,
lack of impulse control, failure to internalize moral norms, and psychiatric
disorders such as depression, anxiety, hyperactivity, and disruptive behavior.” 156
Adults who failed to form a secure attachment as children have great difficulty
with intimate relationships, social interactions, and control of impulses and
emotions; thus, they are at high risk for psychopathology and sociopathology, as
well as criminal behavior likely to lead them to prison. 157 In short, attachment
failure is the root cause of the intergenerational cycle of dysfunction and
criminality.
For many reasons, putting babies in prison with incarcerated birth mothers is
not a sensible strategy for promoting healthy attachment. First, as explained above,
prison is far from a nurturing environment, and mothers “who are anxious or
preoccupied with their own difficulties tend to be inconsistently responsive,
causing the children in their care to develop an insecure pattern of attachment.”158
Second, incarcerated women’s long-standing psychological and emotional
problems pose an obstacle to their ability to give babies the kind of attention and
interactions the babies need. 159 Third, there are the crucial matters of timing and
continuity, which are given far too little attention in the literature and policy
discussions about prison nurseries. The critical time period for attachment begins
152

Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 314.
Id. at 315.
154
Id.
155
Charles H. Zeanah et al., Designing Research to Study the Effects of
Institutionalization on Brain and Behavioral Development: The Bucharest Early
Intervention Project, 15 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 885, 886 (2003) (citations omitted).
156
Dwyer, supra note 63, at 422 n.74 (citing developmental literature documenting
these effects).
157
See Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 317–18.
158
Id. at 315.
159
See Carla Candelori & Maria Dal Dosso, An Experience of Infant Observation in a
Prison, 10 INFANT OBSERVATION 59, 59 (2007); Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at
316–19 (“Caregivers who are unaware of or uncomfortable with their own emotions . . .
encourage their children to suppress needs and feelings and develop . . . compulsive selfreliance and . . . avoidance. . . . Disorganized attachment is predictable from a caregiver’s
unresolved, incoherent feelings about his or her own losses or traumas . . . .”).
153
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after a child reaches the developmental stage of animate-object permanence, which
is typically at around five months, and it continues roughly to age twenty-four
months. 160 Before that time period, children need consistent nurturing and positive
stimulation, but it is not essential that the nurturing come from the person(s) who
will ultimately be the attachment figure(s). 161 Thus, placement of newborns
immediately in prison cannot be justified as necessary to a child’s attachment.162
More important, once the process of forming an attachment to the expected
permanent caregiver commences, it takes substantial time to complete, and it is
crucial that the infant receive continuous nurturance from that caregiver throughout
this period. 163 Thus, significant separations are threatening to the attachment
process and likely psychologically damaging. 164
The realities of incarceration are simply not compatible with this requirement
of stability and continuity. For a woman whose release is scheduled six to eighteen
months after the child’s birth, the attachment process might have begun but not
proceeded far when the mother is thrust back into the community and all its
challenges. The enormous stress of reentry, discussed further below, can interfere
with the attachment process even if a mother and child remain together. The reality
is that separation is very common because many mothers resume substance abuse,
reenter prison, commit child maltreatment, or simply become unwilling or unable
to retain custody of their children. 165 For women whose release dates are beyond
160

Jaffé et al., supra note 135, at 404; Daniel S. Schechter & Erica Willheim,
Disturbances of Attachment and Parental Psychopathology in Early Childhood, 18 CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM., 665, 666 (2009) (“The emergence of
stranger wariness and separation protest, beginning at approximately 7 to 9 months of age
and consolidating by the end of the first year of life, signals the establishment of the
attachment system with its discrimination of, and preference for, the primary attachment
figure.”).
161
See VIVIEN PRIOR & DANYA GLASER, UNDERSTANDING ATTACHMENT AND
ATTACHMENT DISORDERS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 19–20 (2006); Thompson et
al., Group Report: Early Social Attachment and Its Consequences, in ATTACHMENT AND
BONDING: A NEW SYNTHESIS 349, 363 (C. Sue Carter et al. eds., 2006).
162
This is borne out also by studies showing that children placed in adoptive homes
anytime in the first six months have attachment outcomes as good as children who grow up
with biological parents. See Portello, supra note 92, at 178–79.
163
See Goldsmith et al., supra note 134, at 9 (describing the risk that separation from
an established caregiver will cause a child to experience a “serious emotional crisis,
creating at best an adjustment disorder and at worst the development of reactive attachment
disorder,” even when the child is returning to a former caregiver and attachment figure);
Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 317.
164
See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 87.
165
See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, 1997
INTERIM MEETING OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION REPORTS OF THE COUNSEL
ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS 4, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/csaph/csai97.pdf (recommending against creation of more prison nurseries because “it has not been
prove[n] that the skills provided to these mothers and the bonds created between the mother
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the dates their babies will “age out” of the program, as occurs with some frequency
in New York, 166 the attachment process will necessarily be disrupted because the
babies must separate from the mothers. A child typically then goes to live with
relatives, likely having little or no contact with the mother thereafter for as long as
she remains in prison. 167 When the mother does emerge, and if she then assumes
custody despite all the challenges facing her, this causes another potentially
damaging dislocation in the child’s life.168 In addition, prison officials
expeditiously eject from nurseries mothers who violate prison rules, and in those
cases also the attachment process is disrupted. 169
The literature on prison nurseries generally overlooks the crucial fact that
separation from a caregiver after the attachment process is underway or completed
is psychologically traumatic and developmentally damaging for a child, whose
understanding of, comfort with, and trust in the world has been made to depend on
that one person. 170 Even if positive things happen between mother and child while
a mother is in the intensely controlled environment in the prison, it is vital to know
what is likely to happen after mother and child exit prison. Policy makers need to
and infant are maintained after they leave the facility”); Mental Stress: Unique Solutions
for Unique Populations, TEX. MED. OBSERVER, http://txmorgv.com/news/mental-stressunique-solutions-for-unique-populations/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing results of
research on the parenting of former prison nursery mothers, finding that “the majority used
psychological aggression and minor physical assault against their children, and mothers
who had faced significant depression were more likely to utilize physical assault”).
166
See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84.
167
See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 6, 18 (reporting that only about half of
mothers in state prisons had weekly communication with their children, that over half of
incarcerated mothers never had a visit from their children, and only one-fifth had a visit
monthly or more frequently); Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320 (listing some
reasons why children do not visit parents in prison); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1496–97.
168
Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320.
169
See MAWHORR, supra note 42, at 7 (reporting study showing 15% of mothers in
Ohio’s prison nursery were ejected for rule infraction or inattention to their babies);
Deborah Jiang Stein, Babies Behind Bars Nurseries for Incarcerated Mothers and Their
Children, CHILDREN’S VOICE (July/Aug. 2010), http://www.cwla.org/voice/JA10babi
es.html (noting that prison policies are generally quite harsh, requiring the removal of a
baby from the prison if a mother commits any rule infraction, including just a verbal
altercation with another inmate).
170
See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198–200 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
expert testimony on the effect of parent-child removal); Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 389–
90 (noting that “attachment depends on contextual stability in the early years of life . . . .
[C]onsideration needs to be given to potential threats created by separations . . . [and]
[d]evelopment of an attachment relationship is a long and fragile process . . . .”); Byrne et
al., supra note 151, at 80 (“Separations threaten the evolving neurobiological attachment
system.”); Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 295; Pollack, supra note 25, at 19-4
(summarizing studies and research on the effects of attachment disruption); Stein, supra
note 169 (recounting struggles of a woman who, as a child, spent her first year in prison
and thereafter was consigned to foster care).
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ask this crucial question: Are women who get sentenced to state prison generally
individuals whom children can depend on—both while they serve their time and
after they leave prison—to always to be there for the children and provide them
with good care. If the answer is negative, the state should be looking for healthier,
more reliable, and better-functioning parents for these children.
4. Barriers to Reentry
Advocates for prison nurseries generally avoid discussing what mothers and
infants face when the mothers complete their sentence. Yet in other contexts,
advocates for incarcerated women regularly emphasize the formidable challenges
these women face upon reentry. 171 Those challenges largely explain the very high
rate at which mothers separate from prison babies after release. One commentator
warns of potential difficulties:
[M]ost inmate-mothers have low literacy, limited education, limited
work experience, and past alcohol, drug, or mental health problems.
These limitations, in addition to their criminal records, severely curtail
post-release employment opportunities for mothers who have been
incarcerated.
In addition . . . these women are likely to have court-ordered
demands on their time. If past alcohol, drug, or mental health problems
are a matter of record . . . when a mother is released, she must be referred
for treatment ordered by the court, as well as aftercare ordered as a
condition of her release to community supervision. There are often
waiting lists for such programs and often delays in referrals from her
caseworker as well. In addition . . . the mother must attend court hearings
relevant to [any child neglect, abandonment, or abuse proceedings].
These hearings are often adjourned multiple times.
If a mother must attend multiple court hearings, substance abuse
programs, and other requirements of both the Department of Corrections
and the Bureau of Child Welfare, along with reestablishing periods of
visitation with her children, it is doubtful she will keep her employment
for long. . . . However, without such employment she cannot hope to
provide a home for her children . . . . 172

171

See, e.g., BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 16, 21.
Day, supra note 83, at 236–37; see also Carlson, supra note 47, at 22 (noting that
hoped-for “aftercare programs to help women and their babies transition smoothly from the
prison to the community” have not materialized “due to a lack of funding”); Stephanie S.
Covington, Challenges Facing Women Released From Prison, in WOMEN AND GIRLS,
supra note 8, at 44-1, 44-2 (proposing that planning for incarcerated women’s reentry into
the community should begin as soon as a woman begins serving her prison sentence rather
than thirty to sixty days before release, which often provides inadequate resources for the
172
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Many ex-inmates also must deal with substantial resentment from family
members, especially those who took on the burden of caring for older children
while their mothers were in prison. 173 Most ex-inmates have little contact with any
family or friends outside of prison during their sentence, so they lack a support
network when they return to the community. 174
Mothers released from prison also have criminal histories likely to “make it
more difficult . . . to obtain a job, live in subsidized housing, obtain an education,
and obtain welfare benefits . . . .” 175 Such “social exclusions . . . quite effectively
relegate ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society,” 176 where they are likely
to return to the dysfunctions of the past. Federal law requires states to exclude
from welfare benefits and food stamp programs individuals who have been
convicted of a felony involving possession, use, or distribution of drugs. 177 This
leaves many without means to house, feed, and clothe themselves, let alone take
care of children and search for work. 178 Living with relatives is not an option for
those whose relatives are poor and therefore unable to add another member to the
household, or for those with relatives in public housing who could be evicted if an
ex-convict lives with them. 179 Some job training and educational loan programs
exclude ex-convicts, yet most mothers have neither a high school diploma nor job
skills when they enter prison, and, in any event, these women need employment
immediately just to survive and cannot devote time to such programs. 180
Additionally, returning to the community after even just one year in prison is

women upon release from prison); Pfaff, supra note 5, at 1107–08 (discussing the
“collateral costs” of incarceration).
173
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 103, at 811; Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 26; Quinn,
supra note 28 (noting that one woman’s “mother is raising her 2- and 3-year old sons, but
is so angry at her for getting in trouble that she had her phone blocked from receiving calls
from her daughter”).
174
See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 16; Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 95;
Creasie Finney Hairston & James Rollin, Prisoner Reentry: Social Capital and Family
Connections, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 4-1, 4-3–4-5.
175
Abramowicz, supra note 90, at 813; see also McGalliard, supra note 108; Michael
Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586–87
(2006) (citing ineligibility for welfare benefits, educational grants, public housing, and
certain types of jobs and licenses as collateral consequences of criminal convictions); Ross,
supra note 139, at 215 (describing laws denying public assistance and public housing to
persons with drug-related convictions).
176
Pinard & Thompson, supra note 175, at 590.
177
See 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012).
178
See Patricia Allard, Unintended Victims of the Lifetime Welfare Ban for Drug
Offenders, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 16-1, 16-8 to -17.
179
Id. at 16-9 to -17.
180
Id. at 16-11 to -14; see also Maureen Norton-Hawk, Forgotten Victims: The
Children of Incarcerated Mothers, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 21-1, 21-2.
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typically quite disorienting, given the dramatic difference in structure, norms, and
demands relative to prison life. 181
Thus, released inmates’ lives are typically characterized by lack of lawful
employment, instability in housing, lack of child care, efforts to recover older
children from foster care or the custody of family members, little support from
extended family and the state, struggles with environmental factors that led to the
prior criminal activity and substance abuse, difficulty reestablishing relationships
and overcoming the resentment of their children and other family members, serial
cohabitation with men who are not the children’s father and could pose a danger to
the children, risk of partner abuse, additional unintended pregnancies, and
depression and other mental health problems. 182 In the midst of all these severe
challenges, these women must act as single parents to all their children, some of
whom are likely troubled and extremely needy. 183 It is simply unrealistic to expect
them adequately to care for an infant upon release from prison. 184
181

See Margaret Oot Hayes, Mothering After Imprisonment, in INTERRUPTED LIFE,
supra note 83, at 388–91 (discussing the many “obstacles” most women encounter after
being released from prison); Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 123 (“Prison creates
dependent women who have difficulty adapting to the outside.”).
182
See Covington, supra note 172, at 44–42 (“[M]any women find themselves either
homeless or in environments that do not support sober living.”); Goshin & Byrne, supra
note 118, at 95 (“Reentry is further complicated for women who resume childcare
responsibilities soon after release.”); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 811–14 (noting the
economic challenges facing women released from prison); Shirley A. Hill, Why Won’t
African Americans Get (and Stay) Married? Why Should They?, in MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES 345, 356 (H. Elizabeth Peters et al. eds., 2009)
(“The courtship practices of young African American men who lack decent jobs or respect
in mainstream society are often characterized by deceit, violence, and a general disrespect
for women.”); id. at 358 (noting “the diminishing support single mothers are receiving
from the state and their extended families”); Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 122–24
(“The re-adaptation to the world is complex. Prisoners have to re-establish relationships
with their children and family, which are very difficult to just pick up after years of being
away . . . . [R]esuming a relationship after a long period of time needs support and
intensive therapy.”); Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse by Mothers’ Boyfriends: Why the
Overrepresentation?, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 541, 548 (1992) (“[A]lthough mothers’
boyfriends perform comparatively little child care, they are responsible for more child
abuse than any other nonparental caregivers.”); Aruna Radhakrishna et al., Are Father
Surrogates a Risk Factor for Child Maltreatment?, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 281, 286
(2001) (finding the presence in the home of a man who is not a child’s biological father to
be a predictor of child maltreatment); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 262–66 (2001)
(discussing the especially high risk of physical and sexual abuse for daughters of single
mothers); Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 144–45 (noting high recidivism rates among women
released from prison).
183
Some scholars have noted that the “collateral consequences” of incarceration
might impact women more severely than men, precisely because they are generally
expected to bear responsibility for children upon release. See, e.g., Marne L. Lenox,
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Most female convicts come from areas of deep poverty and pervasive crime,
areas without readily accessible support and rehabilitation services or employment
opportunities. 185 The vast majority reacted to this environment in the past by
abusing drugs and alcohol and repeatedly committing crimes. 186 For most, the
children they had before going to prison suffered maltreatment in their care. 187 It
should not be surprising, then, that rates of child neglect, abuse, and abandonment;
resumption of substance abuse; and return to prison are quite high among exinmate mothers. 188 These are predominantly women who have long dealt with
adversity and pain by self-medicating with drugs, and life after prison contains
even greater adversities than existed before. 189 Neither the prisons nor the
Neutralizing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 280, 293–99 (2011).
184
See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 95 (“The search for the necessities of
survival often dominates the immediate post-release period . . . . This struggle may worsen
instead of improve over time as . . . women are overwhelmed with life events and family
obligations.” (citations omitted)); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499 (“[P]ost-prison collateral
penalties make it difficult to maintain a relationship with their children. A host of state and
federal laws impose draconian obstacles to a mother’s successful reentry . . . .”).
185
See Allard, supra note 178, at 16-13 to -14 (recognizing a lack of drug treatment
programs in low-income communities); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 799 (stating that one
cost of high incarceration rates for black women is “a continued break down of already
fragile family and community structures”); id. at 803 (observing “poverty and lack of
community-based resources and criminality” in neighborhoods from which most
incarcerated women come); id. at 811 (noting higher prearrest poverty rates among female
inmates than male); Ross, supra note 139, at 211–12 (describing survey of state
governments that found the vast majority reported insufficient drug treatment programs);
id. at 214 (“[E]ffective treatment programs for women involved with the criminal justice
system are virtually non-existent.”); Scott, supra note 83, at 216.
186
See Norton-Hawk, supra note 180, at 21-2 (“Drug use is endemic within this
population. Almost all the women have tried a variety of both legal and illegal addictive
drugs . . . .”); id. at 21-2 to 21-3 (noting the median number of incarcerations for women
studied was three).
187
See id. at 21-3.
188
See BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 54–57 (describing the high rate of return to drugs
among recently released convicts); Covington, supra note 172, at 44-2 (“Without strong
support in the community to help them navigate the multiple systems and agencies, many
offenders fall back into a life of substance abuse and criminal activity.”); Failinger, supra
note 83, at 500 (“[W]omen offenders frequently take out the rage that they have suppressed
from their own childhood experiences on their children, or neglect or abandon their
children as they descend into the hopeless vortex of drugs and crime.”); Ross, supra note
139, at 212 (citing evidence that drug abusers tend to experience repeated relapses even
when receiving treatment); Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 145 (noting a 39% rate of return to
prison for women in California within three years of release).
189
See Walden, supra note 38 (discussing mothers who had their babies in prison
nursery and resumed substance abuse after release); see also Saar, supra note 97 (noting
that women are often victims of violence before “self-medicating” with illegal drugs); Wolf
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community provide the treatment these women need to avoid replicating past
patterns. 190 For most, their own family members have little hope of their doing
so. 191
Indeed, even inmates and former inmates express a sense of fatalism about
life after release from prison. One former prison-nursery mother explained, “The
funny thing about addiction is it doesn’t matter how much you love your child. It
doesn’t matter how much you want to do good . . . . The addiction has this force
that if you don’t address what the issues are surrounding the addiction, you’re
always going to go back to it.” 192 Another, who had entered prison pregnant three
times, said that after each time she was paroled, she “did what I normally did on
the outside because that’s what addicts do. We’re selfish. . . . The babies aren’t
going to get us clean . . . . I have six kids and that didn’t cure me.” 193
Advocates for women in prison nevertheless commonly assert that programs
unifying them with their children greatly reduce recidivism rates, thus lessening
the chance of later separation. 194 This pitch is crucial to winning the support of
et al., supra note 4, at 143 (“Compared to men, women are less likely to use drugs for
pleasure. Instead, women use drugs to ‘self-medicate’ depression or stress, to numb
themselves from the emotional pain of abuse, or as a means to escape from conditions of
poverty that create emotional stress.”); id. at 144–45 (“Fifty-one percent of the women
committed to California prisons in 2004 were parolees returned to custody. . . . In 1998,
more than half the women returned to prison for parole violations returned for drug
offenses.”).
190
See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 145; see also McGalliard, supra note 108
(“Prisons, as opposed to being places where people can be rehabilitated in the hope of
establishing law-abiding lives and becoming productive members of society, are typically
warehouses to store people until their time has been served. Furthermore, in these cashstrapped times, budget cuts often mean slashing what few services exist, such as
educational, drug treatment or mental health programs.”); BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 56–
57 (discussing the lack of effective drug treatment in and out of prison); Makariev &
Shaver, supra note 11, at 325 (explaining a lack of attachment-related assistance for
incarcerated parents); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 175, at 590.
191
See JESSICA MEYERSON ET AL., VOLUNTEERS OF AM., CHILDHOOD DISRUPTED:
UNDERSTANDING THE FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION 16 (2010),
available at http://www.voa.org/Childhood-Disrupted-Report (reporting a survey result
that 81% of nonparent primary caregivers for children of incarcerated parents expect to
remain the caregiver after the parent’s release); id. at 23 (conveying nonparent caregivers’
distrust of incarcerated parents); id. at 24 (noting that many nonparent caregivers relinquish
physical custody to a mother upon release “contingent upon her ability to ‘get her life in
order’”).
192
Walden, supra note 38.
193
Haddock, supra note 80, at E1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194
DIAMOND & ORWISH-GROSS, supra note 81, at 2 (“There is considerable research
evidence to show that Prison Nursery Programs reduce recidivism rates for incarcerated
mothers that are released.”); Fearn & Parker, supra note 78, at 40; Ford, supra note 78
(“[A] powerful benefit is that women participating in such programs have far lower
recidivism rates.”); Gilad & Gat, supra note 19, at 387–89, 391; Haverty, supra note 52
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legislators and prison officials. But there is actually no evidentiary support for the
claim, and the foregoing discussion gives reason for skepticism. No studies purport
to show reduced recidivism as a result of visitation programs, and those that
advocates tout as showing nursery programs cause a reduction in reoffense rate in
fact do no such thing. Many advocates cite a report from the Nebraska Correctional
Center for Women, which states that in the four years before initiation of a prison
nursery, one-third of women who delivered a baby while incarcerated returned to
prison within three years because of a new crime, whereas in the first five years of
the nursery program, only 9% of nursery graduates had returned after release.195
Some cite similar statistics in two other states (26% vs. 13% in New York and
39% vs. 17% in Washington) as supposed proof that prison nurseries cause a
reduction in recidivism. 196
But that is a misuse of data that anyone with minimal social science
sophistication would recognize. These studies clearly suffer from a selection-bias
problem; in layman’s terms, they compare apples and oranges. Nursery
participants are a special subset of all women who give birth while incarcerated.
The states in which these studies were conducted all impose some form of
screening that excludes candidates who are especially unpromising because of their
history, taking into account the seriousness of their crimes, as reflected in the

(asserting that participating in prison nursery programs cuts a woman’s chances of
reoffending in half); Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut Female Inmates’ Risk of
Reoffending, GAZETTE (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:52 AM), http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31/prisonnurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending/ (quoting Joseph Carlson, author of the
report on Nebraska’s prison nursery, as saying that “[the program] reduces recidivism”).
195
See, e.g., Gilad & Gat, supra note 19, at 388; Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at
276; Vainik, supra note 12, at 683. A more recent report on recidivism in Nebraska, by the
same researcher, Carlson, supra note 47, which will also likely be widely cited with the
false claim that it proves prison nurseries reduce recidivism, claims that the prenursery
recidivism rate was actually 50%, for the same four-year period studied in the earlier
report. Id. at 21–22. It also found a higher recidivism rate—17%—than in the earlier study
for women who completed the prison nursery program. Id. For both groups, the sample was
rather small, and the researcher failed to indicate whether the rate difference was
statistically significant. Id. at 22 (showing a sample of thirty mothers for the prenursery
period and sixty-five prison nursery mothers for the ten-year period studied). In addition, it
appears the researcher did not look at a set time period following reentry for all released
inmates, such as three years postrelease, but rather looked for any recidivism up to the year
2007 for members of the two groups. This means the study looked at recidivism within
seventeen years for some women and recidivism within three years for others, which
obviously undermines the comparison. This study also suffers from the selection bias
problems discussed below, though the author of the report did not acknowledge this.
196
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 47, at 18, 22 (providing recidivism statistics for nine
states that allow incarcerated mothers to keep their babies).
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length of their sentences. 197 As noted above, most programs categorically exclude
women with longer sentences, histories of violence, or past child maltreatment
convictions. Moreover, the prison nursery group in these studies does not include
the substantial percentage of mothers who begin the nursery program but then drop
out, either by choice or because of disciplinary action; the studies do not count
them in the nursery group but rather in the nonnursery group, thus further stacking
the deck in favor of finding a positive outcome with nursery mothers relative to
other inmates. 198
At most, these comparative recidivism figures support a conclusion that the
women who enter and complete a prison nursery program as currently operated are
at a lower risk of returning to prison than are other inmates. But this might be so
entirely because those women have characteristics that would have translated into
a low reoffense rate even if there were no nursery program. These figures in no
way show that imprisoning babies with female criminals heals those inmates or
changes their dispositions. Indeed, the cited statistics are consistent with a
hypothesis that nursery programs increase recidivism for that special population.
The programs could have this effect if having babies with them distracts women
from rehabilitative work they need to do, prevents them from advancing
educationally, undermines the deterrent impact of incarceration, 199 or imposes a
responsibility on them that upon leaving prison becomes a source of great
additional stress for them. We simply do not know what the recidivism rate would
be for those women who qualify for and persist through the nursery programs in
the absence of those programs, so claims that the programs have been shown to
reduce recidivism are indefensible and irresponsible.
That the programs attempt to screen out higher-risk inmates counts in their
favor from a child-centered perspective. But the primary reason legislators and
prison officials support these programs—namely, the promise that they will cause
a reduction in recidivism—remains entirely speculative. Some prison directors
themselves express strong skepticism. An Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction assessment of the state’s prison nursery concluded, after describing the
poor service delivery in the program, the limited time the women were in the
program, the fact that the great majority of them already had children when they
entered prison, and the severe difficulties they faced upon exit, that “program
developers should not expect that this ‘programming’ will have any impact on the
likelihood that these women will recidivate.” 200
197

See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating that thirty women were denied entry into the prison
nursery in Nebraska during the study period, nearly half as many as were studied);
Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 6 (showing that 80% of pregnant inmates were excluded).
198
See Carlson, supra note 47, at 21 (noting that during the ten-year period studied in
Nebraska, “65 women successfully completed the nursery program . . . [and] [t]hirty-eight
other women entered the program but did not complete it”).
199
See, e.g., Kusmer, supra note 30 (quoting an inmate as saying, about being with
her son in a prison nursery, “When he’s with me, I really don’t feel like I’m incarcerated”).
200
Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 27.
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Moreover, as explained above, returning to prison is only one reason why
mothers separate from children. Another is reverting to substance abuse. Resuming
or forming relationships with men who do not want the children around or pose a
danger to the children is another likely cause. Published research confirms a very
high rate of ultimate mother-child separation suffered by prison babies.201 Further,
remaining in maternal custody does not necessarily mean living in a safe and
nurturing environment. The rate of documented maltreatment is high among
parents with criminal histories, and there is much developmental deprivation that
never leads to an agency or court finding of maltreatment.202
5. Prison as Origin and Identity for Black Children
Finally, advocates for prison nurseries and extended visitation also ignore
other potential negative effects on children. They fail to consider the normalization
of the prison environment for these children, who are already at heightened risk of
calling a prison their home when they are adults, and the stigmatizing effect of
forever having to call a prison “my first home” or “where I am from.” Yet that
concern is apparent to many other people. For example, in refusing to order that a
child go to a prison for visitation with a father, a trial court judge in Oregon stated
the following:
[W]hat would be the impact on this child of growing up being
exposed to that situation, and being reminded through life that this is his
origin? I think it almost goes without saying that it would be devastating
to the child. I don’t think there’s any way that we can say it would be in
his best interest, but I think it can be almost automatically said that it
would be horrendously against this child’s best interest to grow up with
that. 203
There is at least anecdotal direct support for the judge’s concern about
normalization and stigma. One woman who began life in a federal prison wrote
about her life thereafter:

201

See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83 (finding that three years after reentry only
44% of mothers who participated in New York’s nursery program had custody of their
children); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 278 (noting a study finding that among
women exiting Nebraska’s prison nursery, “only 57% retained custody of their children
post release”).
202
See Failinger, supra note 83, at 500; Raeder, supra note 78, at 25 (“[O]ne third of
national maltreatment complaints regarding children in in-home settings were made against
caregivers who had been previously arrested.”).
203
Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 649 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding order of
paternity and denial of visitation).
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I was a girl, a teen, and a woman on edge for all of my life until
recently. I found it next to impossible to reconcile my roots, for I’ve
never met a peer with a story quite like mine.
. . . Inmates are an outcast class, by design cast out of society, so
without the right support, it’s natural for a child born inside to end up
feeling outcast as well. 204
Ample indirect support comes from the well-documented phenomenon of
children who grow up in the community suffering from feeling stigmatized if they
have a parent in prison. 205 And it is plausible to suppose that the internalization of
a prison identity and the shame that prison babies later experience increases with
the more time they spend in prison, as this would make their parents’ incarceration
more prominent in their minds and in their sense of self.
Of particular importance to the cause of race equality, these concerns about
normalization and internalization must be especially pronounced with children of
color, who constitute the majority of children whose mothers are incarcerated.
Some women’s advocates cite the disproportionate percentage of female inmates
who are of minority race, as illustrating the social injustice at the root of the
growing prison population. 206 What those advocates fail to recognize is that any
adverse effects on children from tying them permanently to incarcerated parents
and making them live in prison during early formative years are going to fall
disproportionately on children of minority race. We ought to exercise much greater
caution; we ought to think through the consequences much more thoroughly—
taking into account the complex realities of prison life, children’s developmental
needs and lived experience, as well as the tremendous obstacles to successful
reentry—before we put black babies in prison, where they might develop an image
of themselves as persons who belong behind bars.

204

Stein, supra note 169.
See BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 60–61 (describing a young girl’s difficulty with
friends and in school because of her father’s incarceration); Murray & Murray, supra note
72, at 294 (“Incarceration is highly stigmatizing, and this stigma appears to be ‘sticky,’
spreading and adhering to family members, including the children of prisoners. In some
cases, this stigma can lead to peer hostility and rejection.”).
206
See, e.g., BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 2 (“While they constitute only 13
percent of women in the United States, nearly 50 percent of women in prison are African
American. Black women are eight times more likely than white women to be
incarcerated.”); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 798 (remarking on “the overwhelming presence
of women of color, particularly black women, in prisons”); Kennedy, supra note 18, at
166–67, 169; Levy-Pounds, supra note 74, at 298; Vainik, supra note 12, at 674, 680
(arguing that current incarceration of black women should be viewed in light of a history in
which “racist and misogynist attitudes permeated American society”).
205
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C. Advocacy and the Abuse of Social Science Research
The preceding section demonstrates that there are substantial reasons to
believe the ideal motivating creation of prison nurseries—namely, that newborn
children will securely attach to their birth mothers, will remain with their mothers
for the remainder of their childhood, and will live a healthy and happy life—is
actually highly unlikely to be realized for children placed in prison nurseries.
Instead, most seem destined for attachment failure, separation from their mothers,
maltreatment, and long-term mental health problems. Recently published research
on New York’s prison nurseries substantiates these reasons for fear of bad
outcomes for prison babies. I devote a subsection to that research because it
provides an object lesson in how advocates can misuse social science and how
readily policy makers and legislators can be duped if there is no pushback from
another constituency, which is especially likely with policy choices harmful to
children.
A group at the Columbia University School of Nursing, led by Dr. Mary
Byrne, conducted a study of one hundred children who entered the prison nurseries
at maximum-security Bedford Hills and neighboring medium-security Taconic
Correctional Facility during a three-year period. Byrne’s group at Columbia has for
many years been providing clinical services to the incarcerated mothers in these
programs. 207 Although the expectation of objectivity in social science research is
ordinarily incompatible with studying the benefits of a program in which
researchers have a vested interest 208—in particular, an interest in demonstrating
207

See Byrne, et al., supra note 39, at 379 (“[This] intervention consisted of weekly
visits by a Nurse Practitioner . . . incorporating anticipatory guidance regarding infant
development, responsive parenting, maternal life goals, and maternal coping with reentry
issues using . . . interactive communication responsive to mothers’ expressed concerns” as
well as feedback to the mothers on their interactions with their children.); id. at 387 (“[O]ur
NP interventionists provided individualized visits and follow-up contacts with tailored
content focusing on specific moments of maternal-infant behavior, fostering each mother’s
sensitivity to infant development, and encouraging reflective narration about the child as a
unique person.”); see also id. at 388 (conceding that her research could not distinguish any
positive effects of her team’s therapeutic intervention from effects of the prison nursery per
se).
208
See Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research:
Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 36
(2003). Indeed, when the study involves human subjects, and in particular child subjects
who are incapable of giving consent and for whom the researchers’ conclusions could have
life-altering consequences, this self-interest of the researchers raises grave ethical concerns.
See id.; see also 45 CFR § 46.111(b) (requiring additional protection for the rights and
welfare of human subjects who are children or other nonautonomous persons). Relying on
consent from the children’s mothers only exacerbates the concern in this context because
the mothers also have a conflict of interests with the children, standing to benefit
personally from a positive report about the program; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The
Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 517–18 (2007) (noting that
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success in order to secure continued financial and institutional support for the
program 209—the Columbia study is widely cited in support of prison nurseries. 210
In a first round of study, Byrne’s team looked for indications that, upon
reaching one year of age, babies who had been or still were in the prison were
forming attachments with their mothers. The mothers had many of the
characteristics noted above for the female inmate population generally, such as
high rates of substance abuse, prior criminal histories, and having left older
offspring behind when entering prison. 211
Although the research began with one hundred babies, the team reported
results for only thirty. 212 The team’s research report mostly avoids discussing the
“parental consent is central to the research community’s claims about child protection” in
use of children as research subjects).
209
See Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research:
Impossible Dreams and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 141 (2001) (“The
FDA has had regulations in place since 1998 requiring investigators to have no financial
interests in the product and technologies they are testing.”). Columbia University had an
institutional conflict of interest given that it benefits from grant money supporting clinical
experiences for its students, like the School of Nursing’s program at Bedford Hills, so any
approval it gave for this human subject research would be suspect. See Mark Barnes &
Patrik S. Florencio, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: The
Problem of Institutional Conflicts, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 393–94 (2002) (stating that
there is an “assumption that institutional conflicts can influence researchers and
institutional decision makers, including IRB members, IRB staff, and others employed by
the institution. . . . The risk is that their professional judgment may be affected by
institutional pressure to achieve a research end point that is favorable to the institution’s
reputation or financial interests.”). The investigators did employ “blind coders” for the
attachment assessments. Films of mother-child interactions were given to outside assessors
without informing them of the research setting or hypotheses. See Byrne, et al., supra note
39, at 381. That gives some reason for viewing the attachment observations themselves, as
opposed to the report based on them, as unbiased. However, one way a conflict of interests
manifests is with “improper data manipulation.” See Barnes & Florencio, supra, at 394.
Moreover, one might want to know, whether the coders could figure out from the films or
from the fact of being contacted by the Columbia team that the mothers and infants were in
a therapeutic prison program operated by that team. The coding entails subjective
judgments from observations of infants’ behavior.
210
See, e.g., Susan Conova, Do Babies Belong in Prison?, NURSING RES. (Columbia
U. Med. Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Feb./Mar. 2006, http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/nursing/p
df/InVivoByrne.pdf (“The project will have a big impact on the future of these
nurseries. . . . When Dr. Byrne’s study ends next year, other prison systems will have
enough information on child development to make decision about opening their own
nurseries.”).
211
See Borelli et al., supra note 39, at 356 (“Prison nursery residents have histories
that are similar to women in the general prison population.”); id. at 360 (noting that 48% of
the mothers “had between one and eight previous children”); Byrne et al., supra note 151,
at 81–82.
212
Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379.
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fate of the other seventy children. Figuring out what happened to them requires
piecing together bits of information scattered throughout the team’s publications.
The team conducted attachment assessments for an additional twelve children
(forty-two altogether) 213 yet nowhere reported what they found with those other
twelve. The explanations given for excluding those twelve suggest the results were
poor. 214 Among the remaining fifty-eight infants, at least twenty-two experienced
disruption of their relationship with their mothers while they were still in prison,
because of disciplinary action or the mother’s choices, presumably before their
first birthday (when the attachment assessment would have been done).215 Those
twenty-two children who experienced disruption include fourteen whom prison
authorities ejected from the nursery unit, causing an immediate and possibly
traumatic separation of infant from mother. 216 The twenty-two also include three
who separated from their mothers because the mothers decided after a while in the
program that they did not want to continue and returned to the general prison
population, and another five mothers who elected to transfer to a “boot camp drug
treatment.” 217 Presumably, these twenty-two babies were abruptly transferred to
213

Id.
The ostensible reasons for excluding them were (1) that for some there was no
corresponding assessment of the mother’s own attachment status vis-à-vis her parents, and
the team wanted to compare each baby’s attachment status with that of his or her mother,
and (2) that the child was no longer with the mother at the time of assessment. Id. at 379,
388. But neither of those explanations suffices as justification for concealing the results for
this significant number of children for whom attachment was assessed, especially given the
broad claims Byrne ultimately made about positive outcomes for children from spending
time in the prisons. See infra notes 232, 258–265 and accompanying text. Further, both
reasons raise suspicion that the success rate was poor for those children; whatever gives
rise to a mother not completing an assessment herself could be problematic for attachment,
and being separated from the mother obviously presents a problem for becoming attached
to her. The Author asked Byrne by email what the secure attachment rate was for these
twelve, but she declined to respond.
215
See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (noting that of one hundred dyads, forty-two
were given assessments, leaving fifty-eight unassessed); Byrne et al., supra note 151, at
83–84, 86 (noting that three mothers were separated by maternal request, five mothers were
separated due to the mother’s choice to transfer to boot camp drug treatment options, and
the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)
separated fourteen mothers for disciplinary reasons). It is actually unclear whether all of
these twenty-two were among the fifty-eight who never had an attachment assessment; the
twelve assessments on which the team did not report included some children who had
separated from their mothers. Compare Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (noting that of
one hundred dyads, forty-two were given assessments, leaving fifty-eight unassessed), with
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84 (noting that a total of twenty-two mothers were
separated because of disciplinary action or the mother’s choices, but not whether they had
been assessed).
216
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 84, 86.
217
Id. at 83–84. A study of Ohio’s prison nursery similarly showed that nearly 20% of
women who entered the nursery were either ejected or chose to exit from it before their
214
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someone in the outside community, likely someone with whom they had little or
no prior contact and for whom care of the infant was a substantial burden. 218
For these twenty-two children who were suddenly separated from their birth
mothers, it seems reasonable to suppose that the rate of secure attachment to the
birth mother was near zero. 219 In addition, one baby died after contracting a
respiratory infection in the prison. 220 Thus, the team actually knew or could readily
infer the attachment outcomes for as many as sixty-five infants (forty-two for
whom attachment was assessed plus twenty-three who separated from the birth
mother before the first birthday) on their first birthday, but nevertheless reported
and drew policy conclusions on the basis of results for only thirty infants. 221 For
the additional thirty-five, the rate of secure attachment to birth mother was likely
close to zero.
The fate of the remaining infants (those not assessed but not removed from
the program while the mother was still incarcerated) is difficult to discern from the
study reports. Some (the researchers do not reveal how many) left with their
mothers before their first birthday but were separated from the mothers soon
thereafter, and for them the rate of secure attachment to birth mother was likely
also zero or close to zero, because of that separation. 222 Five mothers were
deported at the end of their prison sentences, and it appears that only two of their
babies left the country with them at that time, so three of these mothers separated
from their children, possibly permanently. 223 An additional undisclosed number of
infants could not be assessed because they had not yet progressed to the stage of
physical development at which it is possible to do an attachment assessment. 224
release dates, causing their babies to experience a disruption. See MAWHORR, supra note
42, at 7.
218
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 85–86; see also Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118,
at 97 (“Kinship caregivers . . . faced similar struggles to research participation . . . most
notably poverty, housing instability, and personal histories of criminal justice involvement,
mental illness, and/or substance abuse.”).
219
See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 86 (only a few of the twenty-two ever reunited
with their birth mothers after their releases from prison).
220
Id. at 83. The infant’s mother sued the prison for providing inadequate medical
care to her son. Robin Hindery, Mothering Behind Bars: Prison Nurseries Have Noble
Goals but Mixed Results, YOUTH MATTERS (May 2004), http://web.jrn.columbia.edu/stude
ntwork/youthmatters/2004/just_2_hindery.asp.
221
Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379.
222
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83; see also Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379,
389. Even among those infants who were still with their mother in the community on their
first birthday, and for whom Byrne’s team did report attachment results, most did not form
a secure attachment to the mother. See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379, 382 (reporting
that only six out of fourteen infants in this subcategory showed signs of secure attachment).
223
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 84.
224
Email from Mary Woods Byrne, Professor, Columbia University, Dir., Ctr. for
Children and Families, to author (Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with Author) (stating that
independent mobility is a developmental prerequisite for conducting the Strange Situation
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The team did not reveal the number of children for which that was true, nor did
they discuss whether the slower rate of physical development in these children
might itself suggest something negative about the babies’ well-beings, such as
deficient maternal nurturing or adverse impacts of the prison environment. For an
additional, unspecified number of infants who exited the prison with their mothers
before reaching age one, the team lost contact with the mothers or the mothers
lived too far away from the lab where the team was conducting the attachment
assessments. 225 The team received reports that some of these mothers had
separated from their children or were again engaged in criminal activity that could
lead them back to prison. 226
Thus, perhaps the most interesting part of the Bedford Hills story, and the
most revealing of the true odds of a good outcome for a baby the state places in
prison, is the fate of the seventy children whom the team chose not to discuss in
their report on attachment. As stated above, what policy makers should want to
know is the answer to this: What is the likelihood, for any given newborn child of
an incarcerated woman, that if the state puts that baby into prison he or she will
form a secure attachment to the mother and will not suffer separation from the
mother thereafter (and will not be harmed by the experience of living in prison)?
Both failing to form a secure attachment in the first place and experiencing a
disruption or destruction of the attachment relationship after it forms or begins to
form are seriously detrimental to a child and likely to put the child on a downward
trajectory in life. 227
Among the thirty children on whom the team chose to focus for attachment
purposes, they observed indications of attachment forming in eighteen babies, so
they did document that attachment might be achievable in a prison environment. 228
Attachment “might be” achievable because the one-year point is early in the
attachment stage of development, which is “fragile,” lengthy, and dependent on
“contextual stability in the early years of life.” 229 Subsequent adverse experiences,
to which these children are highly vulnerable, could easily derail the attachment
process. 230 In fact, some of those eighteen were separated from their mothers
Procedure (“SSP”), so infants that had not reached that level of development were
excluded).
225
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–85.
226
Id. at 82 (noting that the researchers received reports of “longer term separation
patterns” among these women); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 97, 98, 102 (reporting
researchers’ belief that some mothers avoided contact because they were again involved in
criminal activity).
227
See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
228
Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 382, 384 (noting that there were indications of
secure attachment for 60% of the thirty children, totaling eighteen).
229
Id. at 389–90.
230
See Inge Bretherton, Parental Incarceration: The Challenges for Attachment
Researchers, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUMAN DEV. 417, 421 (2010) (“One might conclude
[from Byrne’s study] that the year-long in-prison intervention experience interrupted the
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immediately after the assessment, because of New York’s one-year timeline for a
baby’s stay in prison. 231
Despite these reasons for hesitation, and despite the omission of seventy out
of the original one hundred children, Byrne concluded, based on the eighteen-outof-thirty finding, that her study “demonstrates that children raised in a prison
nursery program exhibit measurable rates of secure attachment consistent with or
exceeding population norms.” 232 In other words, she claimed that prison babies on
the whole do just as well in terms of attachment rate as babies who do not live in
prisons, a claim that my deconstruction of the study above shows to be false.
Byrne did add several caveats—namely, that thirty is a small sample, 233 that testing
conditions were constraining, 234 that the attachment process might not continue to
go well after the team’s support services ended235 or when children returned to the
mother’s community of origin with its “multitude of environmental risks,” 236 that
the high risk of mother-child separations was cause for serious concern, 237 and that
the attachments observed might not have occurred without the research team’s
therapeutic involvement with the mothers. 238 But advocates for prison nurseries
predictably have ignored these cautionary notes and have routinely made sweeping
statements to the effect that this study proves prison nurseries are good for
children. 239 State commissions appointed to assess the policy desirability of prison
cycle of intergenerational transmission for many babies with AAI-insecure [Adult
Attachment Interview-insecure] mothers but (given the small sample involved) I have
reservations about making such claims before confirmatory follow-up results from this
longitudinal study become available.”); Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292
(“Importantly, there is evidence that attachment quality can change over time in response to
changes in the caregiving environment, with, for example, secure children later becoming
insecure in response to new family adversities.”).
231
See supra notes 166–168.
232
Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 280.
233
Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 388.
234
Id. at 388–89.
235
Id. at 389.
236
Id. at 390.
237
Id. at 389.
238
Id. at 387–88; see also Bretherton, supra note 230, at 422 (hypothesizing “that the
weekly one-on-one interactions with the nurse practitioner who functioned as a therapeutic
secure base may have been the most efficacious aspect of the Bedford Hills intervention”).
239
See, e.g., DIAMOND & ORWISH-GROSS, supra note 81, at 4 (claiming that Byrne’s
study showed that “71% of infants who lived with their mothers in a prison nursery,
developed secure attachment”); Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental
Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 228, 234–35 (2012) (stating that Byrne’s study
demonstrates “healthier infant development, in addition to reducing recidivism on the part
of mothers”); Carlson, supra note 47, at 17 (citing the Columbia research and asserting,
“This data is strong evidence that nursery program[s] promote bonding”); Press Release,
Women’s Prison Ass’n, supra note 81, available at http://www.corrections.com/articles/21
644-prison-nursery-programs-a-growing-trend-in-women-s-prisons (claiming that Byrne’s
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nurseries repeat these claims that falsely suggest the programs are a success for all
or nearly all babies in them, and legislators do not question these assertions
because no opposing constituency prods them to do so. 240
Yet Byrne’s research actually supports a very negative conclusion. Adding to
the calculations of attachment rate the twenty-two babies 241 who separated from
their mothers while in prison before age one (fourteen because prison officials
ejected the mother, eight because the mothers chose to exit), who undoubtedly did
not form a secure attachment to their birth mothers, changes the rate of secure
attachment to 35% (eighteen out of fifty-two), which is similar to the poor rates of
secure attachment for infants in the community whose mothers are incarcerated. 242
Taking into account also that some of those eighteen who showed signs of secure
attachment suffered separation from their mothers immediately after the
assessment, 243 that many more infants left prison with their mothers but separated
soon thereafter, and that the results were likely poor for the twelve additional
babies who were assessed but excluded from the calculations, the rate of secure
attachment among the one hundred babies originally enrolled in the study must
actually be well below even the very poor rate for children who remain in the
community while their mothers are in prison. And that is what policy makers
should want to know.
Moreover, even for the small percentage of prison babies who do develop
secure attachments to their mothers, the long-term prospects would be poor. The
enormous challenges facing the mothers on reentry create a high likelihood of
maltreatment and disruption of the attachment relationship. 244 Follow-up research

research “indicates that these programs benefit mothers and children”); Kusmer, supra note
30 (“[S]tudies show the children benefit from the contact, said Mary Byrne . . . . The babies
born to mothers in prisons generally are better off staying there with them, she said. The
outcomes are promising . . . .”).
240
See, e.g., CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., PRISON NURSERY FEASIBILITY REPORT 3–4, 27
(2013) (concluding that prison nurseries foster the early child bonding that results in
positive future outcomes for both mother and child, and not mentioning any opposition to
these programs.).
241
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84.
242
Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 376–77; Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292.
243
Ten of the children who were still in the nursery upon reaching age one had to exit
the prison on their first birthdays while the mothers remained, but it is not clear what
overlap there is between those ten and the eighteen with secure attachment indicators.
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83; see also Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379–85 (noting
that the average stay in prison for those mothers whose babies “aged out” of the program at
one year of age was 36.3 months, meaning mothers remained in prison on average two
years after their babies left); id. at 389 (“Typical celebrations of the first birthday in this
study setting are poignant when followed by infant-mother separation . . . .”).
244
See Failinger, supra note 83, at 500 (“[W]omen offenders frequently take out the
rage that they have suppressed from their own childhood experiences on their children, or
neglect or abandon their children as they descend into the hopeless vortex of drugs and
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that Byrne’s team conducted confirms the danger of developmentally damaging
disruption. 245 In addition to continuing to provide services to the study participants
after release, the team recorded the participants’ statuses one year after reentry and
again two years later. The team found at three years after reentry that only twentyfour of the original one hundred children had remained continuously in the care of
their mothers 246 and that most of the children were not in their mother’s custody at
that point. 247
What explains this high rate of separation? In addition to the twenty-two
children who were separated from their mothers while in prison because of
disciplinary action or the mothers’ choice, as well as the ten who were separated
immediately upon turning one because their mothers had more than six months left
to serve, many others experienced separation from their mothers even though they
left prison at the same time as their mothers. Some separations were temporary, but
even those can be traumatic and disrupt a child’s psycho-emotional
development. 248 Others were prolonged and possibly permanent. At least eighteen
mothers returned to prison because of criminal recidivism, 249 and an unspecified
number had drug relapses after release. 250 Moreover, even among the forty-four
women who were primary caretakers of their children at three years after
reentry, 251 undoubtedly some subsequently separated from the children—the team
learned that some of them were involved in criminal activity, substance abuse, or
other parole violations. 252
Even among the 24% of children who remained continuously with their
mothers through the three-year mark after reentry, the rate of secure attachment
was likely around half. 253 Thus, judging from this one longitudinal study of one
crime.”); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499 (“[T]he post-prison collateral penalties make it
difficult [for released mothers] to maintain a relationship with their children.”).
245
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 87.
246
Of these twenty-four children, eight were separated from their mothers for periods
of time. Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83.
247
Id.; see also Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 102 (indicating worse results
would have been likely without the post-release nurse visits).
248
See Goldsmith et al., supra note 134, at 6 (“[A]ny separation, particularly if long
and abrupt, will evoke strong and painful emotional reactions.”).
249
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83.
250
Id. at 84.
251
Id. at 83.
252
See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 102. Byrne did not include these women
in her reports of recidivism or of return to prison. See id.
253
The team did not conduct attachment assessments in the follow-up studies nor
report what overlap there was between the attachment assessments at the one-year mark
and the twenty-four children who remained continuously with their mothers, so one can
only make a reasonable estimate based on other information. These twenty-four children
would not have included the ten who were still with their mothers and in prison on their
first birthdays but who then had to leave the prison while their mothers stayed behind. It
might include the other six children who were still in prison on their first birthdays, and for
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hundred prison babies, conducted by a team that had attitudinal and institutional
motivations to find positive results, the percentage of mother-child relationships
that fulfill the ideal envisioned by prison nursery proponents (secure attachment
and continuous maternal care thereafter) appears to be 10 to 15%. The conclusion
Byrne’s research actually, objectively yields, then, is this: it is possible for the
prison nursery ideal to be realized, but it is very unlikely, and for the great majority
of babies whom states are putting in prisons, the ultimate outcome will entail
attachment failure or disruption; separation from the mothers; and, consequently,
later lives marred by the same dysfunctions their mothers had.
It is difficult to understand why the high rate of separation is not the main
story the research team tells and why it does not lead Byrne and her team to advise
against continuation of this experiment with children’s lives unless and until states
figure out how to prevent separations. Byrne herself writes,
The overwhelming conclusion of existing research in psychology,
psychiatry, and child development is that abrupt separation from a
primary caregiver before 18 months of age has lifelong effects on a
person’s ability to establish healthy relationships and interact in a
positive way with the world. . . . Children who are separated from their
primary caregivers during this period learn that they cannot depend on
others to care for them and that the world is an unpredictable and
frightening place. It is well established that frightening experiences early
in life can lead to disorganization even in an established attachment.
Neurochemical studies show that disruptions to the attachment process
affect the growth and development of the brain, as well as social
functioning, aggressiveness, reaction to stress, and risk for substance
abuse during adulthood. 254
Byrne’s published reports of her research could give readers the impression
that she approached her studies as an advocate for women prisoners and prison
nurseries rather than as a disinterested social scientist. 255 Despite her acknow-

them we might reasonably assume four were securely attached. The remaining eighteen
children who continuously lived with their mothers from birth to three years after reentry
most likely left with their mothers before reaching age one. Among the fourteen children in
that category for whom the team reported results, only six showed signs of secure
attachment, a rate of 43%. Extrapolating from the fourteen to the eighteen, 43% of 18 is
7.7, so let us assume eight children. Eight and four make twelve, or half of the twenty-four.
Without more complete disclosure from the research team, it is not possible to confirm the
accuracy of this estimate.
254
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 86–87 (citations omitted).
255
By “advocate for,” I do not mean occupy a role designated for advocacy, but rather
simply someone who advocates for. It is worth noting, though, that one of Byrne’s official
roles has been supervisor of the clinical program at Columbia University School of Nursing
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ledgement that the recidivism studies are “specious,” 256 she frequently suggests to
readers that policy makers should support prison nurseries because they reduce
recidivism. 257 And despite her own numerous cautions about interpreting the
attachment results that she chose to report, Byrne frequently makes sweepingly
positive assertions about the research in a way that appears designed to convince
readers of the desirability of putting babies in prison: “Evidence that secure
attachment actually does occur in US prison nursery settings provides a strong
argument for their effectiveness” and “these programs are effective for the women
and child participants and are reasonably efficient, but provide access to a small
number of those in need. Limited access is a constraint to the potential widespread
effectiveness of this policy solution.” 258 A reasonable reader could conclude from
these assertions that all or nearly all children in prison nurseries realize “positive
developmental outcomes” and do so because of the prison nurseries, 259 yet that is
patently false. 260
through which her students provide services to the inmate mothers. See Melanie A. Farmer,
Behind Bars: Supporting Mothers in Prison, COLUMBIA U. REC., Nov. 23, 2009, at 4.
256
Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276.
257
See id. at 276 (“Decreased recidivism after release from a nursery program is
currently the positive outcome with the most empirical support . . . . Decreased maternal
recidivism is an undoubtedly positive outcome for children as well as their mothers.”); see
also id. at 289 (“The evidence linking prison nursery participation to large reductions in
recidivism makes them politically viable.”).
258
Id. at 288; see also Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 79 (stating that the team’s
research results “provide evidence of positive infant, toddler, and post-release preschool
outcomes” for “children who resided in a U.S. prison nursery”); Goshin & Byrne, supra
note 35, at 287 (“Contact between incarcerated parents and their children is important.”);
id. at 280 (arguing that prison nurseries are economically efficient for the state); id. at 289
(“The current conservative approach of admitting only low risk mothers may be unrealistic
if departments wish to reach more women and children . . . . Prison nursery programs are a
creative, gender-responsive strategy with the potential to positively affect both incarcerated
women and their infant children.”); id. at 290 (“[P]rison nurseries are a preferred
intervention for policy makers wishing to provide a cohabitation intervention for the
incarcerated mothers with infant children under their jurisdiction . . . . Positive
developmental outcomes for infants who co-resided with their mothers in a US prison
nursery have only recently been documented and provide renewed incentive for coresidence while ameliorating one of the most common concerns.”); Goshin & Byrne, supra
note 118, at 95 (“Parenting interventions that allow women to co-reside with their young
children . . . further extend the potential benefits to the next generation.”). I focus here on
Byrne’s own publications. She is sometimes quoted in news stories speaking in even
stronger advocacy terms, but these might be misquotes. See, e.g., Conova, supra note 210
(“To answer the real question ‘do the babies belong in the prison with their mothers?’—the
answer, so far, seems to be yes.”).
259
Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 290. Byrne also makes misleading statements
about the law governing the prison program, falsely suggesting that courts have ordered
prison officials not to place a child in prison unless and until they conclude that doing so is
in that particular child’s best interests. See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 81 (“[T]he ‘best

2014]

JAILING BLACK BABIES

517

A more objective conclusion from this one study that has been done on the
child welfare impact of prison nurseries in the United States is this: imprisoning
babies with their mothers is a reckless gamble that harms the great majority of
them by tethering the children psycho-emotionally to women who are not capable
of giving a baby the nurturing needed for secure attachment or serving as
consistent long-term caregivers. For the great majority of children, the programs
are a failure likely to cause lifelong adverse consequences. What is most
disheartening from a child welfare perspective is how advocates downplay or
simply ignore this reality, determined to continue the practice for the sake of the
adults whose suffering appears to be their primary concern.

IV. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN PRISON
Part II showed that prison is not a healthy environment for children; it is
highly unlikely children will attach to their incarcerated mothers even when forced
to live with them in prison; if attachment with an incarcerated mother does occur,
there is great risk it will be disrupted; and immediately placing babies born to

interest of the child’ standard applied to community custody cases must also be used to
determine whether a pregnant inmate could keep her child . . . . [C]orrectional authorities
are duty-bound to apply [the best interest] standard when making decisions.”). In fact, the
court decisions she cited to support these assertions (1) were local court decisions
governing only counties that do not include Bedford Hills, and (2) simply held that
incarcerated mothers can challenge an exclusion of their child from the program on the
grounds that prison officials failed to consider whether placement in the prison might be
consistent with the child’s welfare. See Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979) (holding that a sheriff did not abuse his discretion in declining, based on his
assessment of the child’s welfare, a mother’s request to have her baby placed in county jail
with her); Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that a sheriff
improperly denied a jailed mother’s request to place her baby in jail with her because he
did not have sufficient reason to believe this would be contrary to the child’s welfare).
260
At other times, Byrne writes in somewhat more measured terms of attachment
rates, but she still claims too much. She asserts that “this study provides the first evidence
that mothers in a prison nursery setting can raise infants who are securely attached to them
at rates comparable to healthy community children.” Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 375; see
also Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 80 (characterizing the attachment success as
“striking”). She claims that her research “demonstrates that children raised in a prison
nursery program exhibit measurable rates of secure attachment consistent with or
exceeding population norms.” Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 280. And she states that
her study showed babies of “imprisoned pregnant women” achieved attachment “at very
high levels.” Byrne et al., supra note 48, at 27. Her findings do not support even these
assertions because they pertain only to a carefully culled subset of mothers and infants and
only at an early point in the attachment stage of development. To assert that the rate of
secure attachment with “mothers in a prison nursery,” with “imprisoned pregnant women,”
or for “children raised in a prison nursery” ultimately is that reflected in that subset at that
point in time is grossly misleading at best.
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inmates for adoption gives them a far better chance for a healthy and fulfilling life.
Prison nurseries are therefore patently unjustifiable on child welfare grounds. Are
they also unlawful?
Remarkably, no one has asked this question before now. Scholars concerned
about incarceration of parents routinely argue in favor of greater substantive and
procedural protection for those parents as a matter of constitutional entitlement, 261
but they have nothing to say about what rights the Constitution might confer on
children in connection with the state’s placing them in prisons.
This Part considers both constitutional and statutory limitations on placement
of children in prisons. For this first-ever analysis of the question, it affords helpful
simplicity to confine consideration to the extreme case of prison nurseries. This
Part examines the legality of this practice from two perspectives—first viewing it
as a state decision to place babies in prison and second as a state decision to
authorize incarcerated parents to place their children into prison.
Regardless of how one views the situation, for children to spend any amount
of time in prison, there must be some state action that plays a causal role. At some
point, some state officials—whether prison wardens, department of corrections
officials, social service agency employees, legislators, or governors—must decide
that it will happen and, accordingly, either transfer a child in state custody to a
prison or confer on parents or other adults the legal power to bring children into
prisons and keep or leave them there. Such government decision making must be
subject to legal limits even if some private party also plays a role. Clearly, if the
state said that children of inmates must live in the prison with them, we would
recognize a potential constitutional violation. Likewise, if a state decided to put
abandoned children into prisons to live with unrelated inmates at the request of
those inmates and in the hope that this would reduce recidivism, it would certainly
be subject to legal challenge. And if legislatures authorized placement of mentally
disabled adults in prisons to live with incarcerated relatives who so request,
advocates for disabled persons would undoubtedly challenge its legality.
A. May the State Place Infants in Prison?
State placement of infants in prison can be viewed as analogous to a state
decision to remove a free person from the community and sentence him to a prison
term or civilly commit him to a secure psychiatric facility. This is so regardless of
how much nicer a nursery unit is than the rest of the prison; if an entire prison were
just like the nicest existing prison nursery, in terms of accommodations and
decorations, only without babies, no one would deny that it is still a prison. 262 And
261

See, e.g., Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents: Bridging
the Divide, 24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 175, 193 (2012) (“Understanding family integrity as
a substantive due process right is important because it suggests that a high standard should
be used when evaluating federal and state law that terminates parental rights.”).
262
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (“It is of no constitutional consequence—
and of limited practical meaning—that the institution to which he is committed is called an
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there are, of course, constitutional limits on the state’s power to hold people in
prison or other state institutions. These limits arise from individuals’ right to
liberty and bodily integrity, and they have substantive and procedural aspects.
After describing general constitutional limits and rights, this section considers
whether these apply in the case of nonautonomous persons and, if so, whether the
unique situation of parental incarceration warrants creating a special exception to
normal constitutional rules. Lastly, it addresses the implications of federal and
state statutes that prohibit housing minors in adult prisons.
1. General Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Limits
As a general matter, the state may not order individuals into detention
facilities unless it has either (a) charged them with a crime and determined on an
individualized basis that they pose a flight risk or a danger to the community that
can only be addressed by detention, 263 or (b) found in an adversary hearing that
they for some other reason pose a danger to themselves or others that makes
detention necessary. 264 “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” 265 It is, in fact, “the most
elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by
Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving
home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the
child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes ‘a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours’ . . . peopled by guards,
custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide.” (citations omitted)).
263
See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 720 (1990) (holding
that a pretrial detainee may be confined to ensure his presence at trial or in “recognition
[of] the danger [such] a person may pose to others if released” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98225, at 3)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 constitutional because it “authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees
charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to
the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel”
(emphasis added)).
264
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–27 (1979) (holding “that due process
requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere
preponderance of the evidence”); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992)
(holding violative of due process a state statute authorizing detention of a person acquitted
due to insanity, because under it such person was not “entitled to an adversary hearing at
which the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is demonstrably
dangerous to the community”); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731–39 (1972) (holding
indefinite detention of persons found incompetent to stand trial unconstitutional absent
finding of dangerousness. “Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed thereunder
can be held only for a ‘reasonable period of time’ necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future.”).
265
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
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one’s own government.” 266 Incarceration is “the most common and one of the most
feared instruments of state oppression and state indifference.” 267
Under the existing Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine and the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process doctrine, an aim of simply
improving someone’s welfare is patently insufficient to justify infringing liberty by
putting that person in prison, as is an aim of trying to influence the behavior of
other private parties. 268 Many people now living in free society might be better off
if the state put them in prison for a while, but the state may not do so for that
reason alone. Even the aim of protecting individuals from harm by other persons is
insufficient justification for the state to seize persons and place them in prison.
Thus, the state may not arrest and imprison victims of domestic violence to protect
them from further abuse. 269 Presumably, it would not be constitutionally
permissible for the state to react to reports of pervasive abuse in nursing homes by
ordering that elderly persons be housed in prisons instead, even though the state
might better supervise their treatment there.
Children of incarcerated parents do not fall into either of the articulated
exceptions to the general constitutional prohibitions against state confinement of
persons in correctional facilities. They have committed no crime, and they do not
pose a danger to themselves or others. Thus, prison nurseries presumptively violate
those substantive prohibitions.
The state is also subject to substantive constitutional limitations when it
initiates a civil commitment action against mentally ill or mentally disabled
persons; “[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty that requires due process protection.” 270 The Supreme Court has
established that mere deficiency of reason is not sufficient cause for committing a
person to an institution. 271 Even when a mental deficit is clear, “there is still no
constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous
to no one and can live safely in freedom.” 272 Thus, it is clearly insufficient under
civil commitment doctrine that a person might be better off if institutionalized:

266

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268
I do not consider Eighth Amendment doctrine because it applies only following a
criminal conviction. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 64 (1977) (“An examination of the
history of the Amendment and decisions of this Court construing the proscription against
cruel and usual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of
crimes.”). Further, as a descriptive matter, placement of babies in prison nurseries cannot
fairly be characterized as punishment.
269
My research assistants searched in vain for reported instances of this occurring.
270
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
271
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“‘[M]ental illness’ alone
cannot justify a state’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in
simple custodial confinement.”).
272
Id.
267
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[T]o commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding,
the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and
convincing evidence . . . that the person sought to be committed is
mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare and
the protection of others. 273
Indeed, even if a mentally ill person has committed a crime but is found not
guilty by reason of insanity, the state may confine him only so long as he poses a
danger to others. 274 That justification cannot plausibly be invoked to support state
placement of infants in prison. Thus, even if civil commitment doctrine applied
rather than doctrine relating to incarceration, prison nurseries presumptively
violate children’s substantive constitutional rights.
In addition to substantive limitations on state placement of persons in
detention facilities or psychiatric hospitals, there are constitutionally mandated
procedural requirements. These are no minor detail; they are crucial for ensuring
that state actors do not run roughshod over individuals’ rights, especially those of
vulnerable individuals who cannot complain, and that state decision making that
impacts persons’ basic welfare is rational and objective as well as respectful of
rights. 275 First, such state action requires “clear and unquestionable authority of
law.” 276 Prison officials in Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington are violating this
mandate by placing babies in prisons despite the absence of any statute authorizing
the practice. Second, the state action may occur only after a procedurally regular,
individualized adjudication of its appropriateness. 277 Ordinarily the state places
someone in prison for a definite term, such as eighteen months or three years, only
after finding that person committed a crime; to do so, the state must conduct an
273

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992) (emphasis added).
Id. at 76–77; see also O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575–76 (holding that “a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends”).
275
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1967) (“Due process of law is the primary and
indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the
social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: ‘The history of American freedom
is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.’ But in addition, the procedural rules
which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for
the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life
and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance
the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and
conflicting data. ‘Procedure is to law what ‘scientific method’ is to science.’”).
276
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
277
See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (recognizing that “the
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to
furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty”).
274
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individualized hearing, in which the person in question has independent legal
representation, and satisfy the high evidentiary burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 278 Civil commitment similarly requires an individualized
determination of necessity, based on clear and convincing evidence. 279 Yet in none
of the existing nursery programs does any competent authority, prior to ordering a
child’s imprisonment, decide the best choice for a child with an incarcerated
mother—among all alternatives available—through individualized determination,
let alone through finding by clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that a particular child needs to be in prison to avoid imminent
danger of substantial harm. Moreover, whereas a mother might be able to appeal a
decision excluding her from the nursery, 280 there is no mechanism for appealing on
behalf of the child a decision to put him or her in prison; a prison warden’s
decision to put a baby in prison is unreviewable. States are placing children in
prison for months or years without any formal and transparent process and without
independent representation for the children—an obvious violation of children’s
right to procedural due process. 281 That this processless incarceration is happening
primarily to minority-race children makes it especially troubling. 282
2. Do Infants Have “Liberty” Interests?
Doctrine establishing rights against confinement has developed in contexts
involving persons capable of experiencing confinement as a deprivation, and the
Supreme Court has predicated these rights largely on the individual interest in
liberty. A pertinent question is whether infants have the capacity for that
experience or have a sufficient liberty interest such that it is fitting to extend the
doctrine to them.
The Supreme Court has typically spoken in general terms of all persons
having constitutionally protected interests in liberty, rather than in more limited
terms of just autonomous persons having such an interest. For example, in Terry v.

278

See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 (1977) (“[T]he State
does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until
after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”).
279
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75–76, 81.
280
See Haverty, supra note 52, at 3 (reporting a statement by a prison official at
Bedford Hills that there is an appeals process for the mothers).
281
In some programs, there might be a committee that reviews each application that
any woman submits, but the committee does not include a child welfare expert and is not
addressed by an independent advocate for the child whose fate is being decided. See, e.g.,
NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 40, at 3 (naming as decision makers the prison
warden and a committee consisting of the assistant warden, a mental health staff person, a
parenting program coordinator, and the substance abuse unit supervisor).
282
Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (observing that “an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression”).
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Ohio, 283 the Court pronounced, “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.” 284
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 285 the Court reaffirmed “the fundamental nature of a
citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government.” 286
In fact, the Court has explicitly extended substantive and procedural due process
rights to children. 287
However, the Court has also stated on occasion that it views minors’ liberty
interests as weaker than those of adults, simply because children must always be in
someone’s custody and are never fully in control of their own lives and persons
anyway. In Schall v. Martin, 288 for example, the Court upheld a statute authorizing
preadjudication detention of juveniles charged with delinquency, reasoning that
although a “juvenile’s countervailing interest in freedom from institutional
restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial as
well . . . that interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody. Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.” 289 Whatever truth this
assertion has as to teenagers, it is even more true of infants; they are appropriately
always in someone’s custody.
But as this passage suggests, the Court has not stated that any minors have no
constitutionally protected liberty interests at all; though more limited, minors’
liberty interests are still “substantial.” Indeed, some Supreme Court Justices have
taken the position that minors have liberty interests equal to those of adults,
interests the state must justify infringing even when it places minors in a homelike
setting. Concurring in Reno v. Flores, 290 which upheld a federal immigration
policy of holding unaccompanied alien children in state custody pending
deportation if no parent was available to assume custody, Justices O’Connor and
Souter wrote the following:
“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
283

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)).
285
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
286
Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
287
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601–02 (1979) (holding that “a child has a
protectible interest not only in being free of unnecessary bodily restrains but also in not
being labeled erroneously”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1970) (holding that
there is a right to an evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in delinquency
proceedings).
288
467 U.S. 253 (1984).
289
Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
290
507 U.S. 292 (1993).
284
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action.” “Freedom from bodily restraint” means more than freedom from
handcuffs, straitjackets, or detention cells. A person’s core liberty
interests are also implicated when she is confined in a prison, a mental
hospital, or some other form of custodial institution, even if the
conditions of confinement are liberal. This is clear beyond cavil, at least
where adults are concerned. . . .
Children, too, have a core liberty interest in remaining free from
institutional confinement. In this respect, a child’s constitutional
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint” is no narrower than an adult’s.
Beginning with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), we consistently have
rejected the assertion that “a child, unlike an adult, has a right not to
liberty but to custody.” . . .
....
. . . Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event. “The
consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic
where children are involved. [C]hildhood is a particularly vulnerable
time of life and children erroneously institutionalized during their
formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their lives.” 291
Moreover, as an empirical matter, infants are unquestionably affected
physically and psychologically by their environment and have interests threatened
by imprisonment that are properly viewed as liberty interests. Recall the
description of prison presented by child development experts, quoted in Part II,
which emphasized the “spatial shrinking,” “strict temporal constraints,” “[s]ocial
deprivation,” “surveillance,” and inhibition of “the child’s autonomization
process.” 292 Babies undoubtedly experience prison differently than do adults or
teenagers, but they likely also experience it as a confining and oppressive
environment and are adversely affected by the authoritarian control, severely
limited space shared with many people, regimentation, pervasive tension, and
deprivation of innumerable ordinary experiences, including contact with men and
most of the natural world. 293 In fact, babies might incur greater harm from time in
prison than do adults or teenagers, because infancy is a time of intense brain
development, physical growth, and vulnerability. 294 The psychological, physical,
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Id. at 315–18 (O’Connor, J. and Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
292
Jaffé et al., supra note 135, at 402–04.
293
See Hindery, supra note 220 (relating a former prison mother’s ambivalence about
her son’s stay with her in New York’s program, citing the regimentation, spread of
infectious diseases, and lack of normal infant experiences).
294
See Evelyn Wotherspoon et al., Neglected Infants in Family Court, 48 FAM. CT.
REV. 505, 506 (2010).
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social, and developmental interests babies have that are thwarted in a unique way
by imprisonment are fairly characterized as liberty interests.295
Even if infants’ liberty interests are deemed weaker than those of adults, there
is reason to be just as protective of them—namely, that infants are unable to object
to unwarranted incursions. It is too easy for adults to use children instrumentally to
serve adults’ interests—in particular, when the child’s legal parents have interests
contrary to those of the child. The primary motivation prison officials have had for
instituting prison nursery programs is one that might also lead them to institute
pets-in-prison programs—that is, the supposition that it has some positive
rehabilitative effect on the prisoners, which might in turn benefit prison operators
and the rest of society by reducing recidivism and therefore the prison
population.296 The primary motivation of prisoners’ advocates, the initiating force
behind these programs, is to alleviate prisoners’ suffering, just as a pets-in-prison
program might do. It is essential, if children and their liberty interests are to
receive respect and protection, that courts review these programs rigorously and
demand, at a minimum, before the state places any child in an adult prison, an
individualized finding based on at least clear and convincing evidence that
imprisonment is necessary to avoid danger of substantial harm to that child, taking
into account all available alternatives to imprisonment.
A state, therefore, could not plausibly defend placement of babies in prison
against constitutional challenges by asserting that babies have no interest in
liberty—no interest in not being confined to a state correction facility. The relevant
question is what state justification could suffice for infringing that liberty by
placing a child in prison. The Supreme Court has held that some justifications that
might not pertain or suffice with competent adults do so with minors—in
particular, paternalistic efforts to protect minors’ welfare. The Schall Court cited
the state’s authority to protect dependent and vulnerable persons as adequate
justification for brief pretrial detention, stating that “if parental control falters, the
State must play its part as parens patriae. In this respect, the juvenile’s liberty
interests may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State’s ‘parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.’” 297 Certainly
the state and private parties are justified in constraining the freedom of very young
children in some ways just to promote their welfare, and they need not always
demonstrate that this is necessary or the least restrictive means of benefiting the
child.
Nevertheless, with prison nurseries, long-term imprisonment is at issue—not a
temporary detention pending a hearing, not residential placement in a home
environment as with foster care or kin guardianship, and not compulsory school
295

Cf. Mendez v. Rutherford, 655 F. Supp. 115, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that a
complaint on behalf of a three-year-old child stated a cognizable substantive due process
claim for damages against a police department for trauma from watching officers beat her
father).
296
See supra notes 79, 194 and accompanying text.
297
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264–65 (1984) (citations omitted).
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attendance. The Schall Court emphasized that in the context of detention, even in a
facility housing only minors, not just any paternalistic justification will do; the
justification must be proportionate to the severe deprivation that confinement in a
prison-like facility for any period of time constitutes for anyone. 298 The
justification the government relied on was not that the juvenile might simply derive
benefits from pretrial detention, such as by receiving counseling, but that
temporary detention was necessary to prevent him from engaging in more criminal
activity and thereby subjecting others and himself to danger of violence. 299 There
was a danger-to-self-and-others rationale and a necessity, as well as alleged
criminal conduct, consistent with doctrine on pretrial detention of adults.
Thus, any parens patriae justification for prison nurseries must be especially
compelling. It must be far more than would be required to place a child in foster
care, which is typically an imminent risk to a child’s physical health or safety that
is avoidable only by placing the child in state custody. 300 And presumably it must
be more than would be required to place a juvenile under house arrest, which is
proof that the juvenile has committed a crime and poses a danger to the
community. 301 It is not enough that a child might benefit in some ways. Prison is
different. It is different for a teenager, and it is different for an infant. In any case,
as explained in Part II, states simply do not have evidence of any benefits; in fact,
the weight of evidence points to a conclusion that prison nurseries are more
harmful than beneficial to children, even relative to the status quo, and a far worse
alternative than placement for adoption. 302
3. Does the Parent-Child Context Warrant a Special Exception?
Prison nursery programs differ from the pretrial detention at issue in Schall
and from the custodial retention of alien minors in Reno in that, with prison
nurseries, a legal parent is waiting for the babies in the facility in which the state is
placing the child. Incarceration of the child thus has the effect of uniting the child
with a legal parent rather than separating the two; that is the whole purpose. How
does this affect the analysis?
298

Id. at 269.
See id. at 265–66.
300
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(B)(1) (West 2003) (stating that
removal is necessary to ensure a child’s safety when the child is in immediate danger);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028(b) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2013) (outlining what a court
should consider when determining whether it is necessary to temporarily remove a child to
avoid an imminent risk to the child’s life or health); VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(A)–(C)
(2010 & Supp. 2013) (detailing emergency removal procedures where a child is “taken into
immediate custody and placed in shelter care pursuant to an emergency removal order”).
301
See, e.g., In re M.E.B., 569 S.E.2d 683, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that
house arrest is an appropriate disposition only when a juvenile has committed a relatively
serious crime).
302
See supra Part II.
299
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The presence of a competing constitutional right sometimes alters
constitutional analysis. 303 Incarcerated parents, however, have no competing
constitutional right to bring their children into prison. 304 If they did, prisoners,
male and female, would deluge courts across the United States with litigation,
demanding that their children of all ages be incarcerated to live with them. It has
long gone without question that being sentenced to prison for committing a crime
entails losing one’s right to physical custody of children. 305
The significance of the birth mother’s presence in the prison could therefore
only be a factor in applying the test articulated above. Advocates for prison
nurseries might contend that children are in imminent danger of substantial harm
precisely by virtue of separation from their mothers. They would prefer that
incarcerated mothers be transferred to a more homelike setting in the community,
but unless the state does that, they might argue, incarcerating babies is the only
way to protect the babies’ fundamental well-being.
Given the strong constitutional presumption in favor of liberty and
nonincarceration, the burden of proof falls squarely on advocates for prison
nurseries to make this case. Making the case would entail demonstrating that (1)
children of incarcerated birth mothers incur harm when they do not live in prison
with the birth mothers; (2) living in prison with their mothers would avert harm;
and (3) living in prison is the only way to avert harm.
To demonstrate the first of these, advocates can and do point to the very poor
outcomes for most children who live in the community while their mothers are in
prison, much attributable to failure to form a secure attachment with any
permanent parent figure. Pointing to statistics for a large population cannot suffice,
however, to justify incarcerating the entire population. The state may not
institutionalize everyone diagnosed with schizophrenia, for example, based on
studies showing high self-harm rates for this population. Some children born to
303

See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203
(1989) (justifying CPS’s failure to remove an abused child by explaining that “had they
moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have
been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship, charges
based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present charge of failure
to provide adequate protection”).
304
See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (upholding restrictions on
prison visitation with children; applying highly deferential rational basis review; and
stating, “The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does
not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. . . . And, as our cases have
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
incarceration.”); Delancy v. Booth, 400 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding exclusion of inmate mother from prison nursery program and stating, “The
appellant has no constitutional or statutory right to raise the child in prison. Lawful
incarceration limits many privileges and rights, a ‘retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system.’”).
305
Overton, 539 U.S. at 131.
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incarcerated women have good lives without ever living in prison, 306 and for some
who have poor outcomes, it is not because of the mother’s incarceration. There is
variability in this population as to what the alternative to maternal custody is, at
what time of life and for how long separation occurs, what caused the birth mother
to be in prison, and other factors. Children’s procedural due process right requires
an individualized assessment.
To demonstrate the second point, that imprisonment averts harm, advocates
would need to establish that prison babies generally have better outcomes—that
prison nurseries are effective in avoiding the harm supposed to befall this
population of children in the community. As explained in Part II, they cannot show
this. In fact, starting life in prison appears to be even worse for these children—
because of the nature of prison life, because they experience the trauma of
separating from their birth mothers after beginning the attachment process with
them, because they end up in the same bad situations in the community after
separating from their mothers, and because they will always view prison as their
home of origin.
To demonstrate the third proposition, that imprisonment is the only way to
avert harm, advocates would need to satisfy a sort of “least restrictive
environment” test, as the state must do when it places a juvenile charged with
delinquency in a secure facility, civilly commits a mentally ill person, confers
guardianship powers with respect to an elderly adult with diminished capacity, or
makes school placement decisions for children with disabilities. 307 They would
need to show not only that imprisonment with a birth mother is better for a baby
than living in temporary care in the community, but also that no reasonably
available alternative to incarceration would be at least as effective as incarceration
in avoiding the supposed harm to the children. And this they clearly cannot do. The
state could easily place children born to incarcerated women in good, permanent
homes where the children would be quite likely to have very good lives, far better
than the prisons and their birth mothers can provide, by immediately placing them
with adoptive parents.
306

See Delancy, 400 So. 2d at 1270 (upholding the exclusion of a child based on
finding that placement with his grandmother would be better for him under a later-repealed
Florida prison nursery statute, which required an individualized determination that
placement of a child in prison was in his or her best interests).
307
See Cruz v. Collazo, 84 F.R.D. 307, 313 (D.P.R. 1979) (stating that the federal
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 “embraces the principle of the
least restrictive alternative” for juvenile dispositions); Valerie L. Corzine et al., Colorado
Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services and Least Restrictive Environment, 39
COL. LAW. 35 (2010) (discussing the least restrictive environment test in the context of
guardianship and civil commitment proceedings); Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment,
Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis
and Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 158 (2010) (discussing the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act and how it entitles children with disabilities “to
individualized educations in the least restrictive environment”).
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There is no warrant, therefore, for creating a new exception to constitutional
limitations on the state’s power to incarcerate or civilly commit persons, one that
would save prison nurseries from the otherwise ineluctable conclusion that they
violate children’s constitutional rights to liberty and due process. That a child’s
biological parent is in prison is not a good reason from a child welfare perspective,
let alone a compelling justification, for making the child live in prison too.
4. Statutory Limitations
It was once common for states to place juveniles charged with crimes in the
same prisons that housed adults charged or convicted of crimes. 308 Based on a
perception that this was harmful for juveniles, because the harsh atmosphere of
adult prison was antithetical to the state’s rehabilitative aims for juvenile detention
and because adult inmates pose a danger to vulnerable youths, a national consensus
emerged decades ago that (1) juveniles should be spared as much as possible from
any detention in state institutions, and (2) when juveniles must be placed in a state
facility, it must be entirely separate from facilities for adults, and the juveniles
should have no contact with adult criminals. 309 This consensus ultimately produced
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (the “Act”). 310 The
Act imposes on states, as a condition for receiving federal money aimed at
preventing delinquent youths from becoming lifelong criminals, a
“deinstitutionalization mandate.”
Under the Act, minors who have not broken any law but are “dependent,
neglected, or abused,” as well as those who have committed only “status
offenses”—that is, violations of legal prohibitions applicable only to minors, such
as curfew violations or truancy—“shall not be placed in secure detention facilities
or secure correctional facilities.” 311 Juveniles who have committed crimes may be
placed in a detention facility, but they may not be confined in any facility housing
adult inmates or otherwise have any contact with adult inmates. 312 The Act
repeatedly expresses congressional intent that minors should never have any
contact with incarcerated adults, 313 and it makes no distinction between male and
female adult inmates.
Consistent with the federal Act, states, including all those in which prison
nurseries currently exist, have enacted laws and regulations to effectuate this
deinstitutionalization mandate. 314 Many echoed the conclusions regarding youth
308

Douglas E. Abrams, Lessons from Juvenile Justice History in the United States, 4
J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 7, 8–9 (2004).
309
Id. at 10–13.
310
42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5792a (2012).
311
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(B) (2006).
312
Id. § 5633(12).
313
Id. § 5633(12)(A), (13)(A), (13)(B)(i)(I).
314
See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 / 17a-5 (2012); IND. CODE § 31-37-4-4 (2012);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-3503, 43-2404.02 (LexisNexis 2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 4.80
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well-being that underlie the federal law. Nebraska, for example, announced
legislative findings that “the incarceration of juveniles in adult jails, lockups, and
correctional facilities is contrary to the best interests and well-being of juveniles
and frequently inconsistent with state and federal law requiring intervention by the
least restrictive method.” 315
Prison nurseries straightforwardly contravene the Act’s prohibition on
placement of children who have violated no law in secure facilities. They also
violate the provision mandating that no juvenile be “detained or confined” in any
adult prison or have any contact with adult inmates. 316 Congress did not have
prison nurseries in mind when it passed the Act, but the plain meaning of the Act’s
language makes it applicable to all children and thus to prison nurseries; it
proscribes any state action by which children who have committed no crime are
“placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities” or are
“detained or confined in any jail.” 317 Moreover, prison nurseries present the same
dangers to which the federal law was a reaction; babies in prison routinely interact
with numerous adult criminals and therefore are at risk of physical or verbal attack
and of being influenced in a way that makes them more likely to become criminals
later in life.
B. May the State Empower Parents to Place Children in Prisons?
In defense of prison nurseries, states might argue that they themselves do not
place children in prisons but rather merely permit parents to place their children in
prison. The Supreme Court and lower courts have held in some contexts, discussed
(McKinney 2010); 2001 Bill Text NY S.B. 4904 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5119.66, 5139.11(K)(2)(g) (amended 2011); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 26-11A-1, 26-11A6 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.037 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 15-9-1 to -5
(2013); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-121h.
315
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2403 (LexisNexis 2011).
316
42 U.S.C. § 5633(12).
317
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)–(B), (a)(13). The Act does not define “juvenile.”
Dictionaries define the noun as “a young person,” “a child,” and “a person who is not yet
old enough to be legally considered an adult.” See e.g., Juvenile, FREE DICTIONARY,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/juvenile (last visited Apr. 6, 2014); Juvenile, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/juvenile (last visited
Apr. 6, 2014); Juvenile, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definit
ion/english/juvenile (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). The Act defines “jail” in a way that would
include prisons. See 42 U.S.C. § 5603(22) (2006). Because prison nurseries were not the
target of the Act, the federal oversight agency might not take action against them. But most
courts that have decided the question have concluded that the Act creates a private right of
action. See CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ITS DIVISIONS,
AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS § 7:23, Juvenile Justice Act (Jon L. Craig ed., 2d 1996); Horn by
Parks v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
873 (1994) (mem.). Thus, a representative for an incarcerated baby, such as a biological
father, could bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a state operating a prison nursery.
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below, that it does not violate children’s constitutional rights for a state to
empower their parents to seek their commitment to a secure facility. In nearly
every case, the facility in question has been one for treatment of mental illness or
disability. Obviously, with both prison nurseries and civil commitment of minors,
state action plays a determinative role; the state must create or accredit the facility,
confer the power on a parent, approve the parent’s choice, and transport the child
to the facility. But in the civil commitment context, courts have found that the
constitutionally protected authority of parents shapes the analysis of what rights
the minors have.
The leading case is Parham v. J.R., 318 in which children committed to a
psychiatric hospital at their parents’ requests claimed a constitutional right to
greater protection against such commitment. 319 The Supreme Court did not decide
in Parham nor in any other case what substantive test must be met to confine a
minor in such a facility at the request of a parent; the Court has been called on only
to assess the procedures involved. 320 But the Court in Parham did affirm that
children, like adults, have a constitutionally protected liberty interest against
confinement, 321 and it suggested that the confinement must be necessary to serve
the medical needs of the minor.322 Significantly, the Court assumed that children’s
interest in not being institutionalized is subverted not only by the physical restraint
that confinement entails but also by any stigmatization that results from psychiatric
institutionalization. 323 Three Justices who partially dissented expressed the impact
on children’s protected interests more vividly:
Commitment to a mental institution necessarily entails a “massive
curtailment of liberty” and inevitably affects “fundamental rights.”
Persons incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of their
physical liberty, they are also deprived of friends, family, and
community. Institutionalized mental patients must live in unnatural
surroundings under the continuous and detailed control of strangers.
They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if unwarranted,
318

442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 588.
320
Id. at 587.
321
Id. at 600 (“It is not disputed that a child, in common with adults, has a substantial
liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the
state’s involvement in the commitment decision constitutes state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
322
See, e.g., id. at 608 (stating that “the decision should represent an independent
judgment of what the child requires”); id. at 617 (directing remand to determine “whether
every child in the appellee’s class received an adequate, independent diagnosis of his
emotional condition and need for confinement”); id. at 618 (finding “no evidence that the
State, acting as guardian, attempted to admit any child for reasons unrelated to the child’s
need for treatment”).
323
See id. at 601.
319
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may violate their right to bodily integrity. . . . Furthermore, as the Court
recognizes, persons confined in mental institutions are stigmatized as
sick and abnormal during confinement and, in some cases, even after
release.
Because of these considerations, our cases have made clear that
commitment to a mental hospital “is a deprivation of liberty which the
State cannot accomplish without due process of law.”
....
Indeed, it may well be argued that children are entitled to more
protection than are adults. The consequences of an erroneous
commitment decision are more tragic where children are involved. . . .
[C]hildhood is a particularly vulnerable time of life and children
erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may bear the
scars for the rest of their lives. 324
All of these warnings about the threat to children’s welfare also apply to prison
nurseries.
The Parham Court held that commitment pursuant to the Georgia law at issue
did not violate minors’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights,
because the hospitals’ procedures for admission were sufficient to guard against
parents’ illicit motivations or mistaken judgments, and it held that formal
adversary hearings are not constitutionally mandatory. 325 Crucially, the hospitals’
procedures ensured admission only after individualized review, independent of
parents, by professionals with specialized training to determine the needs of each
child, yielding a conclusion of medical necessity. 326 Also important to the Court’s
analysis was an assumption that some deference to the average parent is
appropriate, as parents generally are inclined and able to do what is best for their
children and because adversary hearings would deter some parents from getting
needed help for their child. 327 But the Court affirmed that there must nevertheless
be an independent, professional assessment of the child’s needs. 328
324

Id. at 626–28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
325
Id. at 612–13.
326
Id. at 606–07, 614–16; see also Sec’y of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 649–50 (1979) (upholding Pennsylvania’s procedures for
committing minors to psychiatric hospitals) (“We are satisfied that these procedures
comport with the due process requirements set out earlier. No child is admitted without at
least one and often more psychiatric examinations by an independent team of mental health
professionals whose sole concern under the statute is whether the child needs and can
benefit from institutional care.”).
327
Parham, 442 U.S. at 602–04.
328
Id. at 604 (“[T]he child’s rights and the nature of the commitment decision are
such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide
whether to have a child institutionalized.”); see also Colon v. Collazo, 729 F.2d 32, 35 (1st
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Such an assessment is absent from decisions to place babies in prison
programs. In addition, procedural protections for children whose parents want to
have them placed in prison should be much greater, because the Parham Court’s
crucial assumptions about parents’ ability and altruistic motivation cannot be made
in this context, and because prison is a worse place to put children. Mothers in
prison are not average parents but, rather, are a special subset whose severe
deficiencies in ability to regulate their own lives belie any assumption about their
ability to do what is best for a dependent child. Moreover, unless and until the state
decides that a child will be placed in the mother’s custody in prison, she does not
possess the decision-making rights of legal custody for which normal parents in
the community receive constitutional protection. Mothers in prison are also much
more likely than the average parent to act for selfish reasons in deciding whether
their child will be confined; incarcerated women can vastly improve their own
personal situation practically and psychologically by moving from the general
population to a nursery and having their babies imprisoned with them. Whereas
one might assume a parent would petition to have a child placed in a psychiatric
hospital only against inclination and after intense internal struggle, for a troubled
woman in jail who just gave birth it seems safe to assume that her selfish reasons
for wanting to keep the baby with her would easily overwhelm any thoughts she
might have that the child would be better off living in the community with a
relative or being adopted. Relatedly, the Parham Court’s fear of deterring a parent
from requesting needed help is simply inapplicable in this context.329
Thus, even if one views the situation as one in which the state merely
approves a parental request for institutionalization, rather than itself deciding to
place a child in prison, the Parham decision and its rationale do not support a test
for placement of children in adult prisons that is less rigorous than that dictated by
the incarceration and adult civil commitment doctrines analyzed above. Arguably
the test should be more stringent, or placement of children in prison should be
categorically impermissible, as the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act suggests it should be. 330 In any event, all existing nursery programs fail even
the test for civil commitment, and they must therefore be terminated.
In sum, regardless of how they are conceptualized, all extant prison nursery
programs in the United States violate the substantive and procedural constitutional
rights of children and contravene the command of federal legislation prohibiting
housing of minors in adult prisons. Any legal challenge to them by a representative
for an imprisoned baby should result in immediate closure. Less clear is how a
legal challenge could arise. In a state like New York, where it appears a father’s
consent is irrelevant, 331 a disgruntled father might serve as such a representative.
Cir. 1984) (upholding commitment that occurred only after extensive investigation of
minors’ family and personal background and that was subject to periodic review by social
workers, psychologists, and supporting staff).
329
See Parham, 442 U.S. at 610.
330
42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5792a (2012).
331
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Otherwise, a concerned adult or organization would need to convince a court to
confer representational status. 332

V. CHILDREN AS MEANS TO OTHERS’ ENDS
Advocacy for children-in-prison programs comes from liberal supporters of
incarcerated women. Conservatives jump on board when duped into believing that
such programs reduce crime and therefore taxpayer expense of operating prisons.
For both groups, support for bringing children into adult prisons comes without
empirical support for claims that this is good for children and despite numerous
reasons for believing it bad for children. It comes without rigorous examination of
what little empirical study has been done of effects on children. It comes without
consideration of whether children have legal rights precluding the states from
putting them in prison. It comes with no mention of the alternative of adoption.
And it comes with little dissent. The conclusion is inescapable that in this context,
for nearly all who take an interest in incarcerated women, the welfare of children is
subordinate to the aim of improving these women’s lives or otherwise serving
interests other than those of children.
Consider one example in the legal academy. Professor Desiriee Kennedy has
perhaps written more about this issue than any other law professor. Her depiction
of incarcerated mothers reads like an indictment of them as parents. She writes,
Incarcerated women are more likely to be . . . young, poor, less
educated and largely unskilled. Mothers in prison are often dealing with
addiction and report higher rates of substance abuse than incarcerated
men. Incarcerated women are also more likely than imprisoned fathers to
be struggling with mental health issues. Women in prison report
significantly higher incidences of child abuse and domestic violence as
compared to men. Typically, the available services are insufficient to
meet the needs of these populations. . . .
. . . [I]t is very likely that their crimes may be related to the stress of
raising children, providing for their families, and merely surviving. . . .
....
. . . These families may be trapped in a cycle of poverty, addiction,
child and domestic abuse, and mental illness . . . .
....
. . . [M]any incarcerated women [are] dealing with a number of
complicated and interrelated psychological and mental health problems
that are impossible to address in the time periods prescribed by state and
332

On the legal rules for acquiring representative status for a child, see James G.
Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV.
1321, 1466–74 (1996).
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federal standards. Incarcerated women engage in high levels of drug and
alcohol use and frequently have histories of mental illness and abuse. . . .
....
. . . Children of incarcerated mothers . . . . may be more easily
pulled into a pattern of “intergenerational” crime and are more likely to
engage in illegal activity. . . .
. . . In fact, many come from communities that lack adequate
housing, schools, jobs, and drug and alcohol treatment centers. The result
is that these women may find it difficult to provide for basic needs and
get the assistance they need to cope with the stresses of living at the
margins of society . . . .
....
. . . Women from impoverished communities may have an even
more difficult and stressful role in mothering their children . . . . Many of
these women come from communities which present greater challenges
to mothering and caring for their children than many other mothers. For
example, . . . “[w]omen [in Harlem] spend an extraordinary amount of
time escorting children, limiting their movement, and trying . . . to keep
them away from the violence.” . . .
....
. . . Mothers who are incarcerated may be faced with trying to find
housing and care for their children, may have drug and alcohol problems,
or may have a host of other social and economic problems . . . . 333
A rational, child-centered response to this depiction would be that the state
should find other parents for any newborn child of these women, taking into
account that a newborn has no established relationship with the mother, is readily
adoptable, and needs a healthy, stable, nurturing permanent caregiver in place
within six months. Yet Kennedy concludes from the severe difficulties and
dysfunctions of these women that the state should be more protective of their role
as parents. She argues against termination of parental rights and in favor of more
prison nurseries from a “critical race feminist” perspective, 334 arguing that TPR
“should be viewed as a gendered and political act with community-wide
ramifications” 335 and should be opposed because it “not only removes children
from their communities but disempowers the mother whose only source of
potential power or status may be as a mother, and disempowers communities by
removing their youth.” 336 In this view, the child functions largely like a therapy
333

Kennedy, supra note 18, at 169–200 (citations omitted).
Id. at 166.
335
Id. at 167.
336
Id. at 197; see also Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499–50 (characterizing TPR as
punishment of mothers) (“An analysis of the intersection of prison and foster care in black
women’s lives shows how punishing black mothers is pivotal to the joint operation of
systems that work together to maintain unjust social hierarchies in the United States.”);
334
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dog—something the state could give to a deeply unhealthy person to try to help her
heal—not a person with rights of his own. The child also functions like a welfare
benefit, a resource given to the poor in an effort to make their lives more
tolerable. 337
Many other law review articles follow the same line of reasoning—in
particular, articles complaining about application of Adoption and Safe Families
Act’s 15/22 rule (requiring CPS to petition for TPR if a child has been in nonrelative foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months) to incarcerated
women whose children live outside prison. The authors maintain that this timeline
is too short, that incarcerated mothers cannot be ready to take custody of their
children within that time period, because they are in prison and face severe
challenges after release. 338 But whereas a rational child-centered response to this
reality might be that the state should terminate parental rights immediately, rather
than waiting twenty-two months, so that the children can achieve permanency with
good caregivers sooner rather than later or never, these authors instead argue that
incarceration should be treated as a reason for waiving the deadline, giving
incarcerated mothers much more time! 339 They hardly address the consequences of
that for the children; it is at most a superficial afterthought. For example, some rest
on the point that after twenty-two months in foster care, a child is hard to place for
adoption. 340 This is true, but it again begs the question why the state does not
terminate rights twenty-two months earlier. 341 If the state knows when a woman
Vainik, supra note 12, at 676 (detailing severe problems in women’s lives before they
entered prison, but treating this only as reason for sympathy).
337
See Denise Johnston, Intervention, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS,
supra note 124, at 199, 206–09 (arguing that it is unfair to minority-race women to deny
those with child maltreatment histories the opportunity to have their babies enter prison to
be with them).
338
See, e.g., Day, supra note 83, at 236–38; Roberts, supra note 19, at 1495–99; Ross,
supra note 139, at 217 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison,
without an apartment or a job, whose kin were not available to care for the boy when the
parent was sentenced, will be able to handle the stresses of parenting a demanding child
while seeking to adjust to life after prison.”).
339
See, e.g., ANNE HEMMETT STERN, BABIES BORN TO INCARCERATED MOTHERS 9
(2004); MARGOLIES & KRAFT-STOLAR, supra note 6, at x–xii; Day, supra note 83, at 242;
Roberts, supra note 19, at 1498–99; Ross, supra note 139, at 226–28.
340
See, e.g., Ross, supra note 139, at 224.
341
It also overlooks the fact that if there is no better alternative permanency plan for a
child, TPR will not occur. The 15/22 rule only requires a petition, not an order, for TPR.
The petition requirement contains broad exceptions based on a best-interests showing—
taking into account prospects for adoption—or on a child residing with relatives. In
addition, courts are always precluded from ordering TPR unless they find it would be in the
child’s best interests, all things considered, including potential for adoption. As a legal
matter, there is no such thing as a TPR that is bad for a child. See Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 § 103(a)(3) (1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (2013) (“The family court may order the termination of parental
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enters prison that she cannot parent her child for the next year or longer, because
she will be in prison, and if it knows she will require indefinite additional time
after prison to establish a stable and healthy life before she can assume custody,
why does it not sever the legal tie at the time the woman enters prison, at least as to
any infant children, so a court can quickly create an alternative permanency plan,
such as adoption, that will enable the child to form an attachment to reliable
permanent caregivers? To advocates for incarcerated women, it seems that
possibility is unthinkable.
If they gave serious attention to the well-being of children, scholars who
bemoan the elevated rate of maternal incarceration would at least acknowledge that
the best policy for a newborn might be different from the best policy for a tenyear-old. They would at least recognize as a pertinent question whether a policy
truly designed to do what is best for children should draw a distinction between
children who were in foster care even before their mothers went to prison, because
their mothers abused or neglected them, and children who were in their mother’s
custody until she entered prison. But they contemplate no such distinctions. Their
position is categorical and unbending: the state must preserve female prisoners’
parental status no matter what. Insofar as they have succeeded in advancing their
position, advocates for female convicts have caused children to start life in a prison
and then suffer rupture of whatever relationship they establish there with their birth
mothers, and they have caused children to linger endlessly in foster care, never
achieving family permanence. Their position is thus causing black children to
become deeply troubled black teens who, deep in their psyche, view prison as their
home. Remarkably, no one has studied the long-term outcomes for these former
prison babies.
A thought experiment should make even clearer the adult-centered focus of
advocates for children-in-prison programs and their inclination to protect adults
first and worry about children later or not at all. Suppose Washington revised its
laws so that three years was no longer just the maximum stay in prison nurseries
but also the minimum. In other words, suppose it became a condition for
participation that pregnant inmates agree, regardless of how much time remains on
their sentences, to remain in prison until their child’s third birthday, so that the
attachment process can fully run its course under close supervision. Additionally,
mothers must agree to spend another two years subsequently in a halfway facility,
with substantial restrictions on and close monitoring of their movements and
activities, including their socializing, and with compulsory job training and mental
health services. The state’s aim would be to ensure that mothers who choose to
deny their children the opportunity for adoption by healthy, well-functioning,

rights upon a finding of one or more of the following grounds and a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child . . . .” (emphasis added)); H.G. v. Indiana
Dep’t. of Child Servs., 959 N.E.2d 272, 275, 294 (Ind. App. 2011) (overturning TPR as to
incarcerated parents because the state had not shown it would be in the child’s best
interests, despite the foster parents’ desire to adopt the child).
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nonincarcerated people in good communities remain with the child and stay drugfree in a safe environment at least until the child reaches school age. Thus, a
woman scheduled for release from prison one year after giving birth would have to
agree to an additional four years of confinement and supervision if she wants to
keep her baby.
Prison nursery advocates assert that the prison environment is not so bad for
children and is in any case better than the neighborhoods the mothers came
from. 342 None object that Washington’s three years is too long for children to live
in prison. Even proponents of the nurseries concede the high risk of separation and
attachment disruption upon reentry. 343 So what response would they have to this
hypothetical new policy? Would they endorse it as a promising strategy for
improving outcomes for children, one that lowers the alarming rate of separation?
Would they be receptive to an argument that this policy is also good for the
mothers, as it makes it more likely they will stay on a positive path in life? That is
unimaginable. Undoubtedly, they would reject the policy outright simply because
it is coercive and an additional incursion on women’s liberty, and they would
struggle to find some reason why it is actually not better for the children.
What explains this implicit lexical prioritizing of adults’ interests over
children’s welfare? Liberal advocates for incarcerated women would undoubtedly
in many other contexts strongly support programs that are clearly aimed solely at
improving child welfare, even at the cost of an increased tax burden, such as
subsidized child care, Head Start, and free school lunches. But those are contexts
in which there is no conflict of interests between children and parents. In the
context of parental incarceration, in contrast, there clearly is a potential conflict of
interests, because the adults at issue are predominantly among the most
dysfunctional people in our society, the least able to care for a child. And they are
in a place, adult prison, that has generated national legislation commanding that
children never be housed in it. This context clearly raises the question of whether
the children should even be in a legal relationship with the adults, a negative
answer to which would likely cause suffering to the adults. The conflict of interests
between adults and children is plain. Yet the strong inclination of liberals in
particular is to deny that any conflict exists, develop a policy position that protects
the adults’ interests, and then endeavor mightily to explain why that position does
not sacrifice the welfare of the children.
In this respect, advocacy for prison nurseries epitomizes a broader
phenomenon among scholars, advocates for historically subordinate groups, and
people in general—namely, to view the relationship between biological parents
and children as unlike almost any other good in adults’ lives, including adults’
relationships with other adults. They view the relationship as unique in two
ways—first, as normatively different, insofar as it is something many believe
adults are entitled to even in circumstances when they are entitled to almost
342
343

See supra notes 78, 85–86, 91,149 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 387.
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nothing else, especially if the adults are viewed as victims of social injustice; 344
and second, as empirically different, insofar as children are viewed relative to their
biological parents as something other than distinct persons, as if they are a part of
biological mothers’ very self, or objects of ownership rights. 345 These untenable
views explain why immediate placement of babies born to prison inmates in
adoptive homes is never an option considered in the law, policy, and social science
literature relating to female criminals, even though that option would provide
nearly all of these babies with vastly better life prospects.
In addition to denying that any conflict of interests exists between
incarcerated women and their children, advocates for children-in-prison programs
might point out that these women would not be incarcerated in the first place if the
legal response to their problems were less punitive, if the communities from which
the women came offered more opportunities for healthy and productive lives, if
better treatment for addiction were available to these women, if the state did more
to prevent domestic violence, and in general if life were more fair. All that
counterfactual speculation might be true, but it is morally and legally irrelevant to
what the state ought to do with a child whose mother is incarcerated in this farfrom-perfect world that actually exists. It is fallacious to reason that if something
would not happen in a better world then it should not happen in the actual world.
Adults are entitled to make choices about their relationships based on real-world
circumstances—for example, ending an intimate relationship with a woman
because she goes into prison. Children are entitled to have the state make the best
decision for them about their family relationships, based on real-world
circumstances and the options available to them, including adoption. 346
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See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999) (discussing “blood bias” that causes
state actors and others to attribute to biological parents rights to possession of their children
even when it is harmful to them); Stone, supra note 129 (commenting that “[s]o strong is
the conviction that mothers have an inherent right to parent”). Some former prison inmates
in Canada were bold enough to file suit against the province of British Columbia arguing
that cancellation of a prison nursery program there in 2008, because of perceived dangers
to the children from inmate fighting and drug use, violated the fundamental right of
mothers to have their children with them. See id.; Vivian Luk, Supreme Court hears case
for Mother-Baby Program, GLOBE & MAIL, May 28, 2013, at S.1.
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This view of parenthood is not as archaic as one might imagine. See Bailey v.
Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (“Cases in New York State,
culminating in Bennett v. Jeffreys . . . have shown that a child is no longer considered as a
chattel . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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See generally JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006)
(analyzing what rights children should possess in connection with state decision making
about their personal relationships).
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VI. RECOMMENDATION
To make clear what alternative legal regime this Article recommends, the
following preliminary sketch is offered, limited here to the case of a newborn
child:
First, state laws should direct that when an incarcerated woman gives birth,
prison officials must notify the local child protection agency, and that agency must
conduct an assessment of the child’s situation and develop a permanency plan
recommendation for the child based on that assessment. That assessment would
take into account the mother’s history (including past parenting and pattern of
intimate relationships); the mother’s current mental and physical health (including
substance abuse); the time remaining on the mother’s sentence; the prospects for
the mother’s successful reentry (taking into account family support, employability,
plans for residence, rehabilitative progress, and need to assume custody of older
children); and other possible permanent caregivers (including the child’s father,
extended family members willing to adopt, and unrelated persons interested in
adopting).
Second, state laws should direct the child protection agency to initiate a
juvenile court proceeding, and the court should order the permanency plan that is
most consistent with the baby’s long-term best interests, taking into account
several factors: the agency’s assessment and recommendation, the psychological
benefit children gain when raised by their biological parents or at least by
biologically-related persons, any evidence that the mother or other interested
parties might present to the court, and potential adoptive placements. The mother
should have legal representation, but so too should the child.
Third, putting babies in prison should never be an option. If the mother is
expected to leave prison within six or seven months, and if the court-selected
permanency plan is for her to raise the child, the baby should be placed with a
CPS-approved temporary caregiver until the mother leaves prison. If the mother
has significantly more than seven months remaining to serve, and if there is no
community-based residential program to which the mother can move, then
presumably the permanency plan should not be for the birth mother to occupy the
role of primary caregiver.
Lastly, under any scenario involving placement of the child with an
alternative parent figure, the decision whether that entails TPR as to the mother
should depend on the identity of the alternative parent figure (e.g., family member
vs. stranger) and other considerations. The best outcome for a particular child born
to a prison inmate might be for an aunt to adopt the child, so that the child’s
primary attachment figure has role security and the law can ensure that the birth
mother and child have the opportunity to form a relationship with each other at
some point.
The foregoing is obviously not comprehensive, addressing every possible
permutation and detail. The most important points include the following: (1) state
actors whose normal function includes making assessments about and choices for
children’s welfare (i.e., CPS and juvenile courts, not prison officials) should be
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making such assessments and choices for babies born to incarcerated women; (2)
the state should never choose to put a baby in prison; and (3) the state should
immediately find an alternative permanent primary caregiver for any newborn
child whose mother will be in prison for a substantial portion of the attachment
period or for other reasons is not the best choice for the role of long-term primary
caregiver (despite the child-welfare presumption in favor of her as a biological
parent).

VII. CONCLUSION
Children-in-prison programs reflect a commendable sympathy for the lifelong
disadvantage and deprivation that most prison inmates have suffered and a wish to
transform their lives. But acting primarily on the basis of that sympathy and wish,
rather than focusing realistically on what is truly best for children, is a moral and
policy mistake. Available evidence suggests that the extreme form of connecting
incarcerated birth parents with their offspring, prison nurseries, harms the great
majority of those children, especially when the impact is compared to the life the
children might have had if adopted immediately after birth. Advocacy for this
practice depends on a pretense that there is no conflict of interests between
incarcerated women and their newborn offspring and on misuse of empirical
studies. It is ultimately grounded in a normative commitment to giving lexical
priority to the welfare or happiness of those women. State actors need to recognize
that advocates for incarcerated women are not reliable sources of information
about the child welfare impacts of any policy, and they need to seek that
information elsewhere and make children’s welfare the determinative criterion of
their decisions. But this is likely to occur only when true advocates for children
begin to take an interest in this quietly proliferating practice of putting children in
prison.

